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Notes to the Reader 
I take full responsibility for my own views represented as such herein . 
Although I am employed by the United States Government, this work does not 
reflect the ofiicial views of the U.S. Government. Nor does it imply any 
endorsement thereby. 
VI 
Several Lao names are used in the text. On first reference they are 
rendered in full , with firs t name and surname. However, the usual Lao practice is 
to refer to an individual by his first name alone. I therefore have used thi s method 
(i. e . Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is sometimes referred to as Souvanna.) 
Introduction 
Nobody !mew what was going on because it was supposed to be a secret war. 
There were rumors of colossal battles up north, of CIA bases, and of bombing, but 
they existed in a strange atmosphere of information deprivation. Nobody seemed 
to know anything. 
-- Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon 
For nearly two decades, simultaneous with the war in Vietnam, the United 
States Government was involved in covert paramilitary efforts in Laos. Congress 
did not approve the Laos conflict, which pitted tens of thousands of American-
hired ethnic Hmong-Lao mercenaries against the North Vietnamese army and 
featured a massive bombing campaign by U. S. aircraft. Yet American officials 
were intimately involved in planning and executing these activities, and 
approximately 500 American soldiers, pilots, and covert agents of the U. S. 
Governn1ent were killed or disappeared in Laos between 1955 and 1975. 1 
The four American presidents who presided over the conflict in Vietnam --
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon -- also approved military assistance to, 
and covert action in, Laos. At various times the range of U. S. agencies directly 
involved in operations in Laos included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and various branches of the Department of Defense (DOD). American 
administrations solicited key assistance for the Laos operations from the 
govenm1ent of Thailand, a key ally in the struggle against communism during the 
Cold War. Perhaps most incredibly, tlu·ee American ambassadors to Laos were 
given extraordinary powers to prosecute military activities with almost no 
interference from the Pentagon. 
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Of the many hundreds of millions of U. S. taxpayer dollars expended in 
Laos on the covert war, most still have not been accounted for today. Nor have 
the hundreds of thousands of Lao civilians killed in the war.2 An unknown 
number of them died as a result of blanket bombing by U. S. aircraft attempting to 
deny Hanoi access to the strategic Plain of Jars in northern Laos and to interdict 
the movement of North Vietnamese soldiers and materiel on the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail in southern Laos. 
Although there was general awareness that the United States was involved 
in Laos, Washington-based policy makers were able to keep secret the details of 
American operations there for many years. Lower-level officials in the field were 
under instruction not to speak to representatives from the media. Hampered by a 
wall of silence and by the difficult logistics of getting into and traveling inside 
Laos, the American press corps covered the war only sporadically. When it did, it 
often got its facts wrong, especially during the early years of the war. The late 
Bernard Fall, a French-American historian and war reporter recognized as one of 
the few Western authorities on Laos at the time, charged that inept U. S. reporting 
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unwittingly helped the United States and Royal Lao governments provoke North 
Vietnamese incursions into Laos in 1959. 1 Not until the late 1960s, when 
domestic opposition to American involvement in Vietnam reached fever pitch and 
war reporting moved into correspondingly critical high gear, did the American 
public began to become vaguely aware that the "little" war in Laos was much 
more than that. 
It is an axiom of Western-style journalism theory that reporters write the 
first draft of history. This does not appear to be the case with respect to the 
American war in Laos. For the most part, journalists were not present at the scene 
as it was unfolding; they came to cover the key facts of the war only very late. 
Moreover, much of the U. S. Government' s classified material with respect to 
Laos began to be released only in the 1990s (the Central Intelligence Agency, a 
key player in the story, has not yet released any of its records). Thus we are only 
beginning to learn the full extent of what happened there. Indeed, most of what is 
now known about the war comes not from journalists but from others in a better 
position to know. Most books and articles about the war have been written post 
facto by participant-observers with insider knowledge, by academics, or by anti-
war protesters. (The attached annotated bibliography contains some of the best-
known examples from each category.) 
This researcher believes that it is time for a comprehensive study of the 
role of the U.S. media in covering the covert war in Laos, and this thesis is a first 
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step toward that end. The purpose of the paper that follows is not simply to recite 
the basic details of the war, which can be found in other accounts, most notably 
Timothy Castle's At War in the Shadow of Vietnam and Roger Warner's Shooting 
at the Moon (see bibliography). Rather, my intention is to study how American 
journalists covered, or perhaps failed to cover as well as they should have, the so-
called "secret" war in Laos. In particular, the U. S. press corps seems largely to 
have ignored Laos during the key years l 962-1968, a time when Washington was 
initiating and managing large-scale covert activities there, including the bombing 
of civilian areas. Why is it, as one correspondent put it, that "we (the press) failed 
in Laos"?3 
This thesis is an initial, albeit incomplete, examination of the entire 
complex of circumstances surrounding the environment in which journalists had 
to report; the content of what they wrote; the restrictions they faced; and their own 
behavior in following the Laos angle of the larger Vietnam story. The paper also 
examines in some detail the issue of "secrecy" with respect to this war, and to 
what degree American journalists may have been complicit, wittingly or 
otherwise, in not revealing the extent of American involvement to the American 
public. It incorporates an examination of relevant published sources, including 
original media reports and U. S. and foreign-government documents, and 
interviews with various personalities associated with the war or the American 
media coverage. In sum, it concludes that the mainstream American press corps 
often missed, misreported, or misrepresented the actual situation in Laos during 
the two decades of U. S. military intervention there. Some aspects of the war 
might never appeared in the U. S. press at all had it not been for eleventh-hour 
intervention by a handful of activist anti-war stringers. 
That the U. S. public did not know the extent of American involvement, 
however, was not just the fault of the journalists. My research up to now, which 
has included interviews with more than 30 journalists, participant-observers, and 
academic experts, has led me to hypothesize that the following factors may be 
central to a definitive history of American journalism in Laos, particularly with 
respect to the "secrecy" question : 
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• A series of American presidents and their key advisers, including ambassadors 
in Laos, controlled U. S. policy vis-a-vis Laos. This was especially true during 
times of crises. Even when the White House was not overseeing the day-to-day 
operational details, a small number of bureaucrats on the ground in Laos were 
responsible for implementing policy. Although some key congressional leaders 
were kept advised of certain aspects of American involvement, at no time until 
1969 did the U. S. Congress attempt seriously to intervene to influence or guide 
policy with respect to Laos. 
• The Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 governing the future of Vietnam 
also stipulated that Laos was to be a neutral country. Early on, the United States, 
Russia, and China reached an understanding that Laos would not become a major 
theater of the wider conflict. American officials therefore wanted no publicity 
about the fact that the U. S. Government was operating a combined guerrilla and 
air war designed to keep the North Vietnamese army from taking over Laos, and 
from infiltrating into South Vietnam via Laos. 
• The U.S. Embassy in Laos, and the Royal Lao Government, proactively 
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discouraged investigative reporting on the war. Officials were instructed to make 
no comment to representatives of the press. Unlike in Vietnam, there was no 
standard press guidance about the war because the war presumably was not being 
waged. In Vietnam a reporter could be sure that U. S. diplomatic or military 
officials would have something to say, even if it was something contrived or 
controversial. But in Laos a reporter could not even find a statement with which 
d
. 4 to 1sagree. 
• Reporters based in Hanoi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong found that their editors 
stateside were only tangentially interested in the Laos story. Reporters had 
marching orders to fo llow certain battles and personalities inside Vietnam. They 
therefore found it difficult to find time to travel to Laos and to devote the time and 
energy necessary to fo llow that aspect of the larger Indochina war. As William 
Prochnau has noted, the Laos angle was a "dull dud"5 as far as the U. S. press 
corps was concerned. Likewise, Washington-based reporters failed to do their 
part to investigate what was happening in Laos. 
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• The infrastructure of Laos was (and still is) in poor condition. Roads were 
few and in dangerous condition. In most cases the battle sites were in inaccessible 
areas, and the bombing campaign, which reached a ferocity not seen since World 
War II, created large zones that were off-limits to Westerners. The only way to 
access them would have been via air. Nearly all airplanes and helicopters 
operating at the time in Laos were owned by or under the control of the CIA 
proprietary airline Air America. Air America did not transport newspaper 
reporters until very late in the war, after CIA involvement had become public. 
(Even then, air transport was provided on a case-by-case basis, never routinely.) 
• The political-military situation in Laos was complicated and confusing, and 
most reporters had no background in Lao culture, history, or language. They 
therefore found it difficult to make sense of the internal power struggles. During 
the early 1960s, for example, there were five coups and counter-coups inside the 
Lao government, some pitting members of the same family against each other. It 
is no wonder that among themselves the foreign correspondents referred to the 
Lao capital Vientiane as "Never Never Land" and "The Land of Oz." 
• Like the policy makers themselves, the U. S. media from the mid-l 950s 
through the mid- l 960s were unable to view the Indochina conflict through 
anything but a patriotic, pro-American, anti-Communist prism. They did not 
recognize it as having arisen from complex historical and nationalist factors. 
Thus, as with the conflict in Vietnam, the U. S. media did not seriously question 
U. S. activities in Laos until very late (1969), when rising U. S. casualties in 
Vietnam no longer made it possible for the American public to support the 
Indochina war in general. 
The U.S. War Correspondent in Vietnam: No Time for Laos 
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In contrast to the situation in Vietnam, few news correspondents were 
based in Laos full-time. At any one time the number of foreign stringers present 
in the capital Vientiane could be counted on one hand. By contrast, at the height 
of the Vietnam War approximately 500 foreign correspondents were registered in 
Saigon, and large numbers also were based in Bangkok and 1--Iong Kong.6 Among 
the Western media, only the wire services maintained full-time offices and 
personnel on the ground in the Lao capital, Vientiane: United Press International, 
Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse. These were staffed by 
reporters with only limited experience, or by persons who worked elsewhere and 
did occasional "stringing." Major U. S. news organizations covering Laos, but 
only intermittently, were the New York Times, the Washington Star, the Los 
Angeles Times, and Time-Life. Correspondents for The New Yorker and National 
Geographic occasionally visited and produced some stories that received wide 
coverage.7 
On balance, however, the coverage of the war was very thin. Stories 
tended to be simplistic and to romanticize Laos. Both in their stories and in the 
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journalists' personal behavior, there was too great a focus on the lovely Lao 
women and the opium dens and sex shops. The stories often included errors of 
fact and place. So unreliable were American newspaper reports about Laos in the 
early years (approximately 1955 to 1965) that researchers trying to reconstruct the 
facts many years later have complained about them. Gayle Morrison, whose 1999 
book Sky is Falling documented the CIA evacuation of Hmong refugees after the 
Communist takeover in 1975, said that she found U. S. news accounts only 
broadly helpful. Indeed, she said, the further away from Laos the news 
organization was based, the more unreliable the story. Of the three newspaper 
archives she used in her research, she said, the Bangkok Post was the most 
reliable, the Los Angeles Times less so, and the New York Times (theoretically 
then and now the most prominent American paper) the least so. 8 
The coverage was mainly driven by crises. This fact is not surprising, 
since most of the journalists were not based in Laos. They visited Vientiane only 
when there really was a news "hook" worth following. For example, for the years 
1955 through 1960, a search of the New York Times (hereafter, NYT) revealed the 
following news stories devoted to Laos: I 956, seven articles; 1957, eight articles, 
1958, 11 articles. (It should also be noted that up to 1959, the NYT indexed the 
subject "Laos" under the general category of "Indochina.") However, a sudden 
spike in NYT coverage occurred in 1959, the year that the North Vietnamese Army 
(NV A) began to make tentative pushes across the northeastern border of Laos. 
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Another upsurge in NYT coverage took place in 1961 , following a series of coups 
and counter-coups in Vientiane. Even then, it appears that the journalists missed 
the main aspect of the story--which was that the CIA and the American military 
attache were directly involved in the coups.9 
Between 1962 and 1968, the years of a dramatic and clandestine U. S.-
financed military build-up in Laos, reporters were increasingly devoting their 
energies to Vietnam. Reporters tended to visit Laos only on the weekends or for a 
holiday, and they rarely asked penetrating questions of the U.S. officials who 
were increasingly numing a parallel govenunent in Vientiane, a clandestine 
guerrilla war in the highlands, and a deadly bombing campaign from the air. It 
was not until late 1969, when the U.S. Senate convened a series of hearings 
regarding the security situation in Laos, that the American press corps began to 
cover Laos in a focused and unrelenting way. (It is no coincidence that these 
developments occurred during the year after the Tet Offensive, which marked a 
turning point in American attitudes toward the Indochina conflict in general.) 
And, after President Richard Nixon made the blunder of telling the press in March 
1970 that no Americans had been killed in ground combat in Laos, the press "was 
all over the story like red meat." 10 (Appendix C is a timeline showing some of the 
major developments in the war in Laos and corresponding media coverage.) 
Not surprisingly, coverage of Laos dropped off significantly in 1973 with 
the withdrawal of American soldiers from Vietnam, the final evacuation of the 
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U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and the corresponding departure of most American 
correspondents. However, the reporting on Laos picked up again when tens of 
thousands of Lao and Hmong refugees began to flee across the Mekong River into 
Thailand in late 1975 as the Communists came to power in Vientiane. The 
eventual immigration of many of these refugees to the United States provided a 
different focus for U.S. reporters in the 1980s and 1990s as the media began to 
focus on the problems of their integration into American society. 
Significantly, only three of the original English-language journalists on the 
ground in Laos during the war years --Arthur Dommen, Martin Stuart-Fox, and 
Arnold "Skip" Isaacs--went on to contribute further to our extant knowledge about 
the U. S. covert involvement there. Dommen, a stringer for UPI and then a 
correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, went on to write scholarly books and 
articles focusing on Laos. Stuart-Fox, an Australian correspondent for UPI who 
later became a historian and political scientist, is one of the foremost authorities 
on Laos writing and teaching today. Isaacs, a long-time correspondent for the 
Baltimore Sun, has written various books about the Vietnam War that also address 
the American intervention in Laos. Yet even these tlu·ee acknowledge that 
American journalism could have, and should have, done better by Laos. 11 
Unfortunately, in 1967 a land mine in Vietnam killed the American 
journalist with the most intimate knowledge of Laos at the time, the above-
mentioned Bernard Fall. Fall's Anatomy of a Crisis, an account of the 1961 
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emergency that nearly brought the United States and the Soviet Union to war over 
Laos, still makes for sobering reading today. His death left a critical void in terms 
of expert knowledge about Laos. 
Today more and more is being published about the U. S. covert 
involvement in Laos during the Cold War period, and there is no lack of material 
available for the researcher interested in this topic, including the work of a newer 
generation of journalists. However, it must be said with some concern that most 
of what we know about the war caimot be attributed to the normal first draft of 
history of the original journalists on the ground . That explains my interest in 
undertaking further study of the behavior of the American correspondents and the 
process of news reporting during this critical period in American history. 
Structure of the Thesis 
My findings are organized in the following manner. Chapter 1 sets forth 
the theoretical framework for the study, including the relevant literature in mass 
communication, foreign policy, and history. Chapter 2 is a brief summary of U. S. 
covert activity in Laos in the period 1955 tlu-ough 1975, set against events in 
Vietnam, the larger U. S. domestic political context, and Washington's global 
fight against communism. Chapter 3 discusses how the U. S. press covered the 
Laos angle, including how standard Western journalism "routines" essentially 
failed to produce a coherent or comprehensive "story" of this war. The 
Conclusions offer some final thoughts. 
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Notes to Introduction 
1 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the exact number of those 
still unaccounted for as of March 2001 is 420. The overwhelming majority of 
these were lost in aircraft accidents. 
2 The pre-eminent historian of Laos, Martin Stuart-Fox, estimates the total 
number as up to 200,000 persons. This seems a reasonable figure. It is neither as 
high nor as low as some other sources claim. The true figure is probably 
unknowable since neither the Royal Lao Government nor the Communist regime 
that replaced it kept reliable statistics. 
3 Interview with George Wilson, former Washington Post correspondent, 
May 2000. 
4 A comprehensive account of the military-media relationship in Vietnam 
can be found in William Hammond, Reporting Vietnam, 1998. 
5 William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War: Young War 
Correspondents and the Early Vietnam Battles, 1995. 
6 See Hammond, I 998. 
7 See, for example, Robert Shaplen's series of "Letters from Laos" in the 
New Yorker, including 20 October 1962; 4 May 1968; and 2 August 1970. Also 
see "No Place to Run: The Hmong of Laos" by W.E. Garrett in National 
Geographic, January 1974, pp. 78-111. 
8 Interview with Gayle Monison, June 2000. 
9 I will not be able to confirm this lapse until I have done a more complete 
analysis of the coverage. 
10 Interview with David Greenway (now editorial page editor of the Boston 
Globe), May 2000. 
11 Interviews with Isaacs, May 2000, and Dammen, July 2000. 
Correspondence with Stuart-Fox, January-February 2001. Isaacs does not 
consider himself an "expert" on Laos on the order of Dammen and Stuart-Fox. 
However, I include him because unlike most mainstream American journalists 
who covered Laos, he undertook further study of the topic after the war. 
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Chapter 1 
The Theoretical Context 
In my view, the key to understanding the tragedy that was Indochina for the 
United States lies in studying, recounting, and analyzing our engagement there not 
as an issue separate and divorced from the rest of American foreign policy, but 
rather as an intrinsic and inseparable part of our whole approach to the world in 
the post-World War II period. 
-- Paul Kattenburg, former State Department official, 1979 
... the ideology of the journalist as professional is in important ways a 'false 
consciousness.' Based on the idea that "news judgment" can be politically neutral, 
it not only conceals the process by which the news is shaped politically, but is 
itself a part of that process. It is, in short, a "myth"-- but in a particular sense of 
that word. Far from being a mere lie or illusion, it is a deeply held system of 
consciousness that profoundly affects both the structure of the news organization 
and the day-to-day practice of journalism. 
-- Daniel Hallin, The "Uncensored War" 
The study that follows attempts to make some sense of U. S. media 
coverage of a little-understood aspect of the American conflict in Indochina, the 
so-called "secret war" conducted simultaneously in Laos, Vietnam's western 
neighbor. As this study will make clear, both U. S. officials and the U. S. media 
understood the Laos theater as an adjunct to the conflict in Vietnam. Therefore, it 
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is not possible to evaluate either the war in Laos or press coverage thereof without 
reference to the larger context of the Indochina conflict. 
I began my research with a few basic questions: 1) What happened in 
Laos, and how do we know what we know about what happened there? 2) To 
what extent did the U. S. press corps cover U. S. Government actions with respect 
to Laos? 3) Was their coverage timely, accurate, and appropriate? 4) What was 
the relationship among the journalists, their coverage, and the decisions of U. S. 
foreign policy elites? 5) What affect did the coverage have on the war? Did it 
help explain the war to the American public and thus help bring about its end? 6) 
Conversely, how did the U.S. Government's handling of the war affect the 
journalists or their coverage? 
No Systematic Study Thus Far 
These seemingly simple questions proved extremely difficult to answer. 
For as yet, there has been no systematic study of this issue. First of all, the extant 
American literature on the war in Laos is scant, and most of it was not written by 
journalists, at least not by the journalists who initially reported from Laos. 
Indeed, most was written by participant-observers, who naturally tended to 
describe what happened from their own particular vantage point. Thus, a full 
understanding, even by those who participated, still awaits the declassification of 
the files of American intelligence agencies. I have constructed an annotated 
bibliography (Appendix C) which lays out the principal available resources. 
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This literature falls into several categories: general histories; memoirs of 
journalists and participant-observers, including foreign-policy elites; academic 
studies; anti-war tracts; congressional testimony; and so forth. The most helpful 
secondary sources for reconstructing the basic facts of the war are Stanley 
Karnow, Vietnam; Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos,· Charles Stevenson, The 
End of Nowhere,· Geoffrey Gunn, Political Struggles in Laos,· Arthur Oommen, 
Conflict in Laos,· Timothy Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam,· Christopher 
Robbins, The Ravens,· and Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon. 1 
Yet none of these stands alone as a full general history and analysis of the 
elites' decision-making process, including the response and role of Western 
journalists. Stevenson (1973), to be discussed more fully below, comes closest; 
unfortunately, his account ends in 1971, and is thus incomplete. Karnow (1983) is 
most helpful at understanding the Indochina conflict in global context. Dommen 
( 1971) is comprehensive and masterly at the Lao elites' internal struggles, but, 
like Stevenson, deals with events only up to 1971. Gunn ( 1988) is essential for 
understanding the foundation of the Indochinese Communist Party and the 
development of the relationship between North Vietnam and the armed wing of 
Lao communism, the Pathet Lao, but his story ends before the time period covered 
here. Robbins describes the "secret war" through the eyes of the Air Force 
aviators who flew into Laos. Similarly, Warner (1996) frames the tale mainly 
from the point of view of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives. 
Castle is based on the most recently declassified documents, but deals only with 
U. S. military assistance to the Royal Lao Government. 
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There have been various histories of the professional and personal 
behaviors and routines of war correspondents, and specifically of the U.S. press 
corps ' performance in Vietnam. The most helpful for the project at hand were 
Philip Knightley's classic, The First Casualty, which examines the "mythology" 
of combat reporters dating to the Crimean War; and William Prochnau's Once 
Upon A Distant War and William Hammond's Reporting Vietnam. The last two 
deal specifically with the reporters in Vietnam and include some references to 
Laos. However, there has been little if any work focusing on the performance of 
war correspondents in Laos per se. The journalists' own memoirs have done 
little to illuminate what they were attempting to achieve in Laos or how they went 
about it. 
Likewise, the academic literature analyzing the relationship between the 
mass media and U. S. foreign-policy decision-making with respect to Vietnam 
(and by extension to Laos) is also surprisingly scant. The reasons for this 
paiiicular dearth are varied. Traditionally, those writing about foreign policy and 
the media have represented two different schools -- political science and mass 
communication -- that have only recently begun to make the most of each other' s 
research and expertise. On the political science side, the great classics of foreign-
policy literature predate not only America' s involvement in Indochina, but also 
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the ascent of television and thus the critique of that medium, which was so central 
to our collective understanding of the conflict. Meanwhile, communications 
specialists delving into the political realm have tended to focus on voter behavior 
and public-opinion polling, not on foreign-policy making. 
The arcane subject of U.S. foreign policy, even with respect to such a 
seminal event as the Indochina conflict, has been relegated mainly to general 
histories and memoirs of the practitioners. These include former presidents, 
secretaries of state, and other officials, some of whom make only passing or 
grudging reference to the role of the press. And there is the very opaqueness of 
the subject matter. Nothing much has changed since political scientist James 
Rosenau observed more than a generation ago (Domestic Sources of American 
Foreign Policy, 1967) that the "link between the media and foreign policy is not 
easily observed and resistant to coherent analysis." 
That academe still awaits a definitive body of work on the 
interrelationship among the U. S. media, U. S. public opinion, and foreign-policy 
decision-making with respect to Laos does not mean that one cannot construct a 
rough outline of the considerable scholarly thought that has been expended on it 
indirectly through exploration of other topics. Therefore, I have found it 
necessary, in the course of this research, to analyze and assemble a variety of 
sources that heretofore have not been presented collectively in this manner. 
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Propositions to Be Tested 
In the rest of this chapter, I will be testing a set of common propositions 
arising from the relevant, albeit inadequate, literature. I list the propositions first, 
and in the following discussion summarize the theoretical underpinnings for each. 
Their direct relevance will become clearer as we proceed to an accounting of 
American involvement in Laos in Chapter 2, and to the study of the journalists 
and their journalism in Chapter 3. To wit: 
1) A confluence of historical and constitutional factors gave the President of 
the United States, as opposed to the Congress, pre-eminence in foreign-
policy making, particularly during crises. 
2) The American public is generally disinterested in foreign-policy issues and 
is willing to defer to the president. 
3) Although foreign affairs subjects are considered "big" or "prestige" 
stories, they account for only a small percentage of news reports in the 
American media. 
4) The internal routines and mores of the journalistic profession in the United 
States militate against the media's challenging the executive branch on 
foreign-policy issues. 
5) Despite the popular conception of the press having a "watchdog" function 
in the U. S. policy-making process, the U. S. media are businesses 
primarily concerned with making a profit. The media thus have a 
predisposition to accept the status quo with respect to societal structures 
and outputs, including public policy. 
6) The media generally endorse presidential decisions in foreign affairs, 
except in the conspicuous absence of executive leadership on a particular 
issue. 
7) Despite the considerable evidence supporting propositions 1-6, foreign 
policy elites attribute to the media much more power to create a negative 
public backlash than in fact exists. They expend enormous amounts of 
time and energy in "spinning" the media (i.e. via pseudo-events, press 
conferences and releases, and leaks). 
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8) Foreign-policy elites, as opposed to the general public, are the primary 
consumers of media coverage of international affairs. Ironically, the main 
relationship between the media and foreign policy may thus be that 
foreign-policy elites (particularly the president) are engaged in an 
unproductive, ceaseless effort to squash or manipulate coverage that 
already has been contrived to favor the elites ' position. 
9) From the mid-1950s onward, foreign-policy elites in Washington and 
Vientiane decided they wanted no publicity regarding covert American 
activities in Laos. They proactively discouraged investigative reporting, 
and they provided little press guidance or assistance to the reporters. 
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10) If propositions 3-5 are sustainable, it follows that the headquarters of U. S. 
media outlets would have been only tangentially interested in the Laos 
story. Their concern was Vietnam, on which U. S. official and public 
attention was focused. Reporters, therefore, would have had little time, 
energy, or incentive to cover Laos. Few reporters would have been 
actually assigned to cover Laos from inside Laos. They would not have 
been equipped with the language, cultural, or historical background to deal 
with the particularities of the situation in Laos. 
The combined weight of propositions 1-10 leads to the inexorable 
hypothesis that U. S. media coverage of the Laos theater was limited, incomplete, 
and heavily tilted toward the U. S. Government version of events. Indeed, as later 
sections of this research will demonstrate, U.S . journalism in Laos fell far short 
of what was actually occurring there during the years 1955-1975. 
Presidential Pre-Eminence, Public Disinterest 
According to the relevant literature, U. S. foreign policy -- at least during 
crises -- is formulated outside the normal arena of pressure group politics that 
characterizes the making of domestic policy. (I will return later to the inherent 
"liberal pluralist" conception that permeates most U. S. communications and 
political science literature.) Although the U. S. Constitution provided for a 
system of checks and balances in the conduct of the country 's international 
relations (i.e. the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the 
Congress has the power to make war), in practice foreign policy has generally 
been in the hands of the president, particularly since World War II. Spanier and 
Uslaner (Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemmas, 1982) summarize the 
traditional political science model within which foreign policy is thought to be 
made. It is a framework that places the mass media at the far periphery: 
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The dominant model of foreign-policy decision-making is that of the 
concentric circles. In these circles, the central decision-making locus on 
foreign policy is the president and his key advisers . In the second circle 
are the bureaucracies in the major foreign policy agencies and the armed 
services, the second-rank and less influential foreign policy departments, 
presidential advisers, and cabinet members whose primary responsibility is 
in the domestic sphere but who may be consulted on foreign policy 
questions, and scientists. The innermost circle is composed of a select few 
members of the administration; the outer circles have successively more 
members and, correspondingly, less impact on foreign policy decisions. 
Traditionally we have placed Congress in the third circle, together with 
political parties and interest groups; the fourth, outer circle comprises 
public opinion and the media (81 ). 
According to these writers, the critical inner circle is "especially 
prominent" in decision-making with respect to crises (122). Indeed, according to 
this model , which has been used by political scientists with minimal variation for 
half a century, the mass media have very little, if any, effect on foreign-policy 
decisions, especially during a crisis. According to James Rosenau: 
Foreign policy deals with events and circumstances outside the system, 
and being in the environment, these events and circumstances can appear 
potentially threatening to members of the system . ... Fellow system 
members thus come to be viewed as a "we" who are constantly endangered 
by a "them" (1967: 24). 
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It quite naturally follows that system members (including the public and 
the media) look to the president to resolve the crisis. Theodore Sorensen, one of 
President Ke1medy's top aides, put it this way: 
In domestic affairs, a presidential decision is usually the begi1ming of 
public debate. In foreign affairs, the issues are frequently so complex, the 
facts so obscure, and the period for decision so short, that the American 
people have from the begi1ming -- and even more so in this century --
delegated to the President more discretion in this vital area and they are 
usually willing to support any reasonable decision he makes. (Decision-
Making in the White House, 1963: 48). 
Sorensen should know, as he found himself in Kennedy's "inner circle" 
during the so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis" of November 1962, which has 
become the most frequently analyzed case of crisis foreign-policy decision-
making. Graham Allison (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, 1971) is the definitive text. (Stevenson's End of Nowhere applies 
Allison's model to Laos. My discussion in Chapter 2 of certain decisions with 
respect to Laos relies heavily on his analysis.) 
Indeed, ifwe are to believe Allison and the myriad other historians of that 
crisis--which brought Washington and Moscow to the brink of nuclear war--
Kennedy consulted in addition to Sorensen only about a dozen other people, 
including his brother Robert Kennedy, the attorney general. President Kennedy 
did not consult with Congress until he already had made up his mind to use a 
blockade, not air strikes, against the Russian missiles in Cuba. For its part, the 
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Washington press corps had little idea of how critical the situation was until it was 
almost over. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is useful for conceptualizing various models of 
policy-making as applied to the conduct of international relations. According to 
Theodore Lowi ("Making Democracy Safe for the World," 1967), the American 
political system comprises several subsystems--elitist, pluralist, and massified. In 
theory, elites make decisions about the distribution of resources. Competing 
interest groups (Congress and the bureaucracies) regulate resources. The system 
interacts with the masses (public opinion) only in the distribution of resources. 
Applying this model to foreign policy, Lowi observes that crisis decisions 
are indeed the province of the elites: "The fundamental feature of crisis decisions 
is that they involve institution leaders without their institutions" (301). At such 
times, he says, policy hews closely to the framework set out by C. Wright Mills 
(The Power Elite, 1959): the elites work in unison, if not harmony. However, the 
daily management of non-crisis, routine foreign policy is something quite 
different: 
A modern, highly generated state generates conflict that cannot altogether 
be taken care of by mere elite management but must necessarily involve, 
under varying circumstances, a great deal of bargaining and logrolling 
(Lowi, 299). 
Thus does the entire apparatus of the foreign-policy establishment come 
into play--the departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and any other bureaucracy or individual who holds a stake in the process--with 
predictable consequences: 
When there is time for planning there is time for disagreement. .. 
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Disagreement spreads the area of involvement toward all individuals who 
possess or represent resources that would improve the positions of the 
initial combatants. More and more individuals, values, and institutions 
become involved as the stakes increase and the time allows. As the area of 
involvement spreads, it also decentralizes to include the more public 
resources and strategies" (Lowi, 302). 
Similarly, Spanier and Uslaner (1982: 164) account for the difference 
between crisis and non-crisis decision-making by positing two different models, 
those of "rational actor" and "bureaucratic politics." The first model assumes a 
unitary actor (in consultation with his or her inner circle). The actor must select 
objectives, consider the alternative means to reach the objective, calculate the 
consequences of the alternative course, and choose the course most likely to 
obtain the objectives. Time is short, and so is the scope of the decision-making 
arena. 
The bureaucratic model, by contrast, involves just that: a host of actors 
from the various executive agencies, plus interest groups, Congressional 
committees, and anyone else who can make his views known. Bureaucratic 
decision-making "resembles a brawl, usually an unseemly one at that. For the 
issue is not whose policy position and recommendation is correct. The issue is 
not who is right but how to reconcile -- if that is possible -- many conflicting 
interpretations of what the correct policy should be" (Spanier and U slaner, 166). 
Other characteristics of the bureaucratic model include bargaining and 
compromise (recall Lowi's "logrolling" concept). The result can range from an 
incremental change in policy to a "paralysis of policy" or stalemate (Spanier and 
U slaner, 167). Furthermore, the process generally creates a debilitating side 
effect: "Old policies and the old assumptions upon which they are based tend to 
survive longer than the conditions which produced these policies initially" 
(Spanier and Uslaner, 168). 
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While the confusion and messiness of bureaucratic foreign policy may lead 
one to conclude that it is more "democratic" than crisis decision-making, that is 
not so. The salient feature of public opinion is that it rarely speaks with one 
voice. Decision-makers, even if they are willing to consider the public's views, 
may not be able to discern exactly what kind of policy the public wants. Not 
surprisingly, the overwhelming finding of the extant research is that public 
opinion with respect to foreign policy generally follows the decision-makers, not 
the other way around. The reasons for this are quite simple, according to 
Rosenau: 
For most citizens the external environment is simply an "out there," an 
undifferentiated mass that can be threatening but rarely is. It is only when 
rapid changes occur in the environment that this mass acquires structure 
for most citizens and thereby appears to be linked to their own welfare in 
potentially damaging ways .. .. Usually they are inclined to leave its 
management to officialdom, an inclination which is not nearly so 
widespread with respect to those seemingly close-at-hand, highly 
structured phenomena that constitute domestic affairs (1967: 26). 
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And then there is that portion of the literature that finds normative value in 
presidential pre-eminence in foreign-policy formation. Political scientist Gabriel 
Almond, who coined the "civic culture" concept that has become so central to the 
American polity' s definition of itself, concedes the "policy disunity and conflict" 
characteristic of the American system (The American People and Foreign Policy, 
1950: 158). However, he then goes on to make a sweeping generalization: 
. . . there is a general ideological consensus in the United States in which 
the mass of the population and its leadership generally share. At the level 
of basic attitudes this is largely an unconscious consensus of feeling with 
regard to values and of reactions regarded as suitable in response to certain 
political cues. At the level of general opinion on public policy, one may 
speak of a consensus of mood, of shared emotional states in response to 
changes in the domestic and foreign arenas. Neither in foreign nor in 
domestic policy is this to be understood as full agreement on principles or 
on details, but rather as an adherence to a broad compromise on political 
procedures and policies. Such adherence ranges from unqualified 
enthusiasm to a mere readiness to tolerate (158). 
In sum, Almond would have us believe that such shared consensual values 
mean that the general public can look to the president in good confidence for 
"cues and responses" in discussions of foreign policy. 
Where do the mass media fit into this complex web? Cohen ("Mass 
Communication and Foreign Policy," in Rosenau, 1967) observes that the mass 
media and those who operate it can handle only one main foreign-policy issue at a 
time. This phenomenon makes it difficult for the media to mobilize public views 
with respect to a host of foreign policies that may be occurring simultaneously. I 
will return to the limitations of news gathering and news making both in a 
theoretical sense and in their relationship to Laos. 
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Kegley and Wittkopf (American Foreign Policy, Patterns and Process, 
1982) call the media only a "cog in the machinery" of foreign policy making 
(311 ). Not only is the American public disinterested in, and uninformed about, 
foreign affairs; the capacity of mass media to influence foreign-policy attitudes is 
undermined by government manipulation. But public opinion can act as a 
restraint. Policy makers derive most of their information directly from the mass 
media. Policy makers must consider what the market will bear; "they use public 
opinion to obtain support for actions already taken" (291 ). 
The Example of the Iran Hostage Crisis 
With these various models in mind, let us now consider another case of 
foreign-policy making, namely the crisis created by the taking of the American 
hostages in Iran in November 1978. The hostage crisis is a good example of the 
"market" of public opinion collapsing under the weight of an indecisive, 
incomplete, or fai led policy. Spanier and Uslaner recall that President Carter's 
approval rating initially improved dramatically following the taking of the 
hostages, from 30 percent to more than 60 percent. But as the hostage situation 
wore on without resolution, public confidence in the president declined. 
Moreover, "the constant media exposure of the Iranian situation served to 
highlight the President's inability to resolve the issue" (Spanier and Uslaner, 149). 
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Based on what we already have seen, we should not be surprised that 
initially President Carter sought to manage the crisis himself. He made a famous 
vow, which he would later regret, that he would "not leave the Rose Garden" until 
the hostages had come home. According to various reports, Carter's inner circle 
consisted of just five persons, two of whom--Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell--
were politicos from his home state of Georgia. Carter did not bring State 
Department or other experts into the circle even as the crisis dragged on into 1979 
and into the election year of 1980. Nor did Carter give Congress prior notice of 
the failed military mission to rescue the hostages. 
However, unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had lasted hardly a 
fortnight, the crisis with Iran lasted 444 days, giving the media enough time to 
react and intervene. Indeed, the sideshow that the media mounted in response to 
the hostage crisis has been the subject of numerous studies. According to Spanier 
and Uslaner (175), President Carter's objectives during the crisis were to follow a 
policy of restraint and gradually apply sanctions to make it more costly for Iran to 
hold the hostages. The key was to gain the hostage's freedom, but without paying 
the price that the Iranians had set for ending the crisis (sending the Shah, then in 
the United States for medical treatment, back to Tehran to face the 
revolutionaries). However, as James Larson' s analysis ("Television and U. S. 
Foreign Policy: The Case of the Iranian Hostage Crisis," 1986) makes plain, the 
media made it extremely difficult for Carter to carry out these aims. 
Carter fell victim to a television technology that had, by 1978, become 
"inherently transnational in nature," Larson writes (111 ). The interminable 
presence of television cameras made it impossible for Carter to hold "private or 
secret negotiations" on the hostage matter. Paradoxically, the president and the 
Islamic mullahs in Telu·an appealed their respective cases directly to an 
international television audience -- and thus indirectly to each other. 2 
The Limits of Professional Journalism 
Indeed, Larson's major findings in the hostage case relate to the routines 
of news work and the limits those routines placed on the coverage of the story: 
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First, "access to appropriate pictures" was critical to news gathering (112). Before 
the hostage crisis, the networks had no correspondents in Iran (notwithstanding 
that the U.S. had been heavily engaged there for two decades) and thus had no 
access to pictures. Once the story began, there was an imperative to gather 
appropriate footage. The networks suddenly devoted a disproportionate, 
saturation coverage to Iran, a country previously unknown to most of the 
American public. 
But the "story" did not analyze the politico-economic factors inside Iran 
that had led to the revolution and thus to the crisis; instead of presenting the 
historical context, television journalism focused only on one angle: getting the 
hostages out. This focus required an over-dependence on routine, Washington-
based sources of information: press conferences, briefings, and backgrounds. The 
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resulting Washington-focused story had little relevance to reality in Iran; it was, 
according to Larson, "an ahistorical account" that followed , and was obsessed by, 
U.S. Government policy (114) . Predictably, the primary U.S. players -- Carter 
and his entourage -- responded "not to the 'objective' facts of the situation but 
rather to the ' image' of the situation" (115) . Paradoxically, it was an image that 
Carter himself had helped create. 
The hostage case persuasively illustrates that the mass media can cover 
foreign policy as a "beat" only insofar as the operational constraints guiding the 
media industry will allow. There is a rich literature examining the internal 
workings of the media and of news journalism in particular. Schudson's 
important study (Discovering the News: A Social History a/American 
Newspapers, 1978) describes the transformation, beginning in the 1890s, of 
American journalism from a gumshoe "storytelling" profession into one that 
placed priority on the production of "facts" and "neutral information." Schudson 
recounts the origins of the "beat" system; the rising "professionalization" of the 
trade; and most importantly, the inculcation of the goal of "objectivity" into news 
production. These developments collectively produced a trend of deference 
toward organized authority and, particularly beginning with World War II, an 
increasing intimacy between the press and the "national security state." 
For Douglas Kellner (to whom I will return in depth below), there was 
something almost Machiavellian about this trend. "Government officials play a 
key role in determining what is and is not news," he wrote (Television and the 
Crisis of Democracy, 1990: 105). The result is a news product that is 
overwhelmingly pro-government: 
The media serve the interests of the state by privileging the president and 
Congress as sources of news: by favorably presenting, at least initially, 
new government programs; and by generally supporting government 
foreign policy initiatives (I 05). 
Kellner called such tendencies "hegemonic," and wrote that they were 
buttressed by a high degree of selectivity in "newsworthiness--failing to pursue 
some stories while dwelling on others"; codes of "fairness" dictating that both 
sides of a story be told; and the positivistic view that only "facts" count. Several 
other communications researchers (Herbert Gans, Gaye Tuclunan) analyzed the 
"routines" of modern-day news work, and found a high degree of predictability 
and conformity therein. Obviously, American journalism, constrained as it was 
by the twin imperatives of increasing advertising revenues and keeping costs 
down, could not be expected to devote much time or effort to foreign policy. 
Gans 's seminal content analysis of network television (Deciding What's News , 
1980) found that only 14 percent of broadcast news could be classified as 
"foreign"--and even this small amount centered almost entirely on international 
events that impacted the United States (31). 
Even political scientists noticed these distressing trends. Cohen calculated 
that newspapers allocated only between five to eight percent of the news hole to 
international stories ( 1967: 196). There is no mass market for foreign-policy 
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news; he wrote. Moreover, he observed no special type of training or path of 
experience differentiating the reporters/editors who handle foreign-policy news 
from those responsible for domestic affairs. He learned that the beat system does 
not produce genuine expertise, and that foreign correspondents were generally 
generalists. Moreover, the correspondents tended to be bunched together in 
Europe; few were located elsewhere, since it was well known that Americans 
were only interested in reading and hearing about news from "friendly" countries 
(197-199). 3 
Ironically, Cohen observed, the "foreign" beat had come to be known as 
the "prestige" beat; stories with an international element were now considered the 
"big" stories. Not surprisingly, Washington reporters covering foreign news 
looked for, and got, most of their leads from sources at the "prestige" locations: 
the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon (1967: 198-199). The 
major foreign-policy players were now not only part of the story; they were 
ghostwriting it from behind the scenes. 
Spinning the Press 
It now becomes helpful to draw together the various tlu·eads of the foreign 
policy-mass media literature. Hence I turn to the seminal work of Daniel Boorstin 
and two of his disciples, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz. Boorstin's The Image 
(1961) is one of America's best-selling nonfiction books of all time and a classic 
for introductory journalism courses. It introduced the theory of "pseudo-events," 
which strongly influenced communications research ever after. Boorstin' s 
assertion that "the power to make a reportable event is the power to make 
experience" (10) may seem self-evident and not particularly subversive on its 
face. But its audacity lay in describing a particularly unseemly aspect of 
American journalism, especially with regard to the Washington press 
establishment: the reporting power lay not just in the hands of journalists but 
increasingly in those of government officials. 
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The livelihood of reporters, Boorstin noted, now depended upon "their 
collaboration with public figures" (16). He railed against the perfidious interview 
teclmique, one of the stock tools of the journalist's trade, calling it a "devious 
apparatus" that perversely "incites" public officials "to make statements which 
will sound like news." He attributed the inflation in the power and prestige of the 
presidency in part to "the rise of centralized news gathering and broadcasting, and 
the increase of the Washington press corps." The danger, Boorstin opined, is that 
"the President has an ever more ready, more frequent, and more centralized access 
to the world of pseudo-events" (24). 
Not that the blame for this lamentable state of affairs was one-sided. 
Boorstin also faulted the elites themselves for contributing to the peculiar 
relationship of "concealment and contrivance" between the media and the 
government. Starting with the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, he 
observed, the White House had perfected a system of press releases, fireside chats, 
plaimed leaks, and "group production" to portray the President in the most 
flattering light (17). 
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Boorstin's insights are important to our purposes for several reasons. He 
was a pioneer in identifying the trend of "generated" as opposed to "spontaneous" 
news, of calculation and collusion between big government and big media. He 
recognized the destructive power of the "leak" and called attention to it. And he 
saw the "spin" before it even had a name. 
Building on Boorstin, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz have created a 
substantial literature of the concept of "media events" (Media Events: The Live 
Broadcasting of History, 1994 ). These televised phenomena, which first found 
full expression in the aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination, have since 
reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and technical wizardry. 
Broadcasters have tapped into a deep desire on the part of the public to be 
included in "shamanic" events such as patriotic festivals, state funerals, royal 
weddings, diplomatic summits, and the like. Such events permit television 
viewers to celebrate consensual values. They perform an integrative role, 
promoting reconciliation and perpetuating loyalty to established values and 
institutions. 
But media events have dark implications, too. A broadcaster who agrees 
to stage such an event is by definition politically vulnerable. He has accepted an 
"apostolic mission," and for the duration of the broadcast will be unable to 
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"switch back to regular (i.e. critical) jomnalism" (Dayan and Katz, 91). The 
format and scripting of the event inevitably cast the principals (generally the 
president and other elites) as heroic figures. This method bestows a legitimacy on 
the event that may not be justified. The "live" nature of the broadcast creates an 
inevitable pressure on the producer to "succeed." He therefore cannot and will 
not adapt a critical adversarial stance with regard to the event. He must perform 
an integrative function, socializing citizens to the socio-political structure of the 
event and their role therein. 
Indeed, the central characteristic of a media event is the production of an 
illusion. The viewer mistakenly believes that he is participating in an event at 
which he is not present (he merely follows the script from his living-room chair). 
And as we know from our previous discussion, the illusion is particularly 
deceptive with respect to diplomacy and foreign affairs, in which only a 
minuscule percentage of the American electorate has any interest at all. If citizen 
viewers cannot themselves contribute to foreign-policy formation, what is the 
function of the media in producing diplomatic "events"? 
The answer is clear from the example of the Iran hostage crisis. Media 
events have the ability to displace intermediaries, "to talk over the heads of the 
middlemen" (Dayan and Katz, 204) and to abet summitry. At the same time, they 
create a heavy pressure on diplomacy to "go public." The era of quiet diplomacy 
in smoke-filled rooms is over. Moreover, media events are able to edit collective 
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memory and thus rewrite history. (Most Americans' knowledge of Iran can be 
summed up in the television clip of the blindfolded hostages in front of the U. S. 
Embassy in Tehran, in much the same way that their memory of the Kennedy 
assassination is comprised of a series of televised images: Jackie standing next to 
Lyndon Johnson in a bloodstained pink suit, Lee Harvey Oswald crumpling in 
pain at being shot). 
The production of media events has several disturbing implications. First, 
broadcasters "collude" with organizers (foreign-policy elites, particularly the 
president, for our purposes). So routinized have media events become in modem 
society that they are now an important part of the "civil religion" (Dayan and 
Katz, 207). This in tum raises the question of "hegemonic abuse," as journalists 
set aside their critical distance and become a reverent part of the scenery. 
The Contributions of Critical Theory 
How best to summarize the literature described above? The answer is 
clear: Foreign-policy elites, as opposed to the general public, are the primary 
consumers of media coverage of international affairs. Moreover, they actively 
trigger and manage such coverage. Ironically, it follows that the main relationship 
between the media and foreign policy may be that foreign policy elites 
(particularly the White House) are engaged in an unproductive, ceaseless effort to 
manipulate stories which have already been contrived to favor artificially their 
own position. 
39 
This, my proposition 8 introduced above, seems to fit the reasoning of 
proponents of so-called "critical theory," such as Daniel Hallin and Douglas 
Kellner. These two researchers make ample use of the Gramscian concept of 
"hegemony" and of the so-called "propaganda" model advanced by Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky (Manufacturing Consent, 1988), to which I will 
return. Both Hallin and Kellner also attribute much of their thinking to the work 
of the German social scientist Jurgen Habermas, and in particular to his The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Habermas' theory, simply put, 
is that in the late 18th century economic interests began to take over the media, as 
well as the state, transforming the public from participants in democracy into 
consumers of mass culture. 
Kellner's work takes Habermas, and critical theory, to its logical extreme. 
(The gist of "critical theory," as opposed to the theory ofliberal pluralism, is that 
not all interests and perspectives are equally represented in the media. Given an 
unequal distribution of political-economic power in the larger society, some 
members of society have greater access to communication institutions than others 
have.) 
For Kellner, the liberal pluralist model of democracy has been rendered 
inelevant in the television age. As television's overriding concern is to make 
money, covering public affairs is useful insofar as it contributes to corporate 
profit. Television programming is constantly preoccupied with raising its viewer 
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ratings and its market share. It is, therefore, devoted entirely to "creating attention 
for attention's sake." As a result, television's ability to play a constructive role in 
the public sphere is questionable at best. Indeed, Kellner believes that 
"democratic functions of the media have been severely curtailed during the short 
history of television in the United States" (72). Television has harmed, not 
contributed to , democratic debate and policy formulation. 
How is this possible, given American television' s offering of a vast 
number of stations and theoretically unlimited choice and diversity? According to 
Kellner, while U. S. television seems to produce great opportunities for pluralism, 
the reality is that the methodology underlying television programming is designed 
to produce conformity with the capitalist system. Kellner writes that the main role 
of the media in the United States is to advance the hegemonic views of the ruling 
government and business elites: 
Ideology becomes hegemonic when it is widely accepted as describing 
"the way things are," inducing people to consent to the institutions and 
practices dominant in their society and its way of life. . . . Hegemonic 
ideology serves as a means of "indirect rule" that is a powerful force for 
social cohesion and stability ( 17). 
Kellner asserts that the very history of radio and television demonstrates 
how these technologies "sold citizens on the virtue of commercial capitalism and 
helped legitimate the capitalist system" (28). According to Kellner, the 
communications media in this country were the product of hegemonic and 
monopolistic tendencies: In the early years of the respective technologies, AT&T 
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controlled the phone system; Western Union, the telegraph; RCA, Westinghouse 
and GE, the radio; and CBS and NBC, radio broadcasting. U.S. Government 
actions further entrenched the position of the media monopolies. During World 
War II, for example, radio played an important role in mobilizing people for the 
war effort. Similarly, both radio and television broadcasting disseminated the 
govenunent's virulent anti-Communist, Cold War rhetoric. This pro-government 
bias has had serious consequences: 
In general, television tends to reproduce the positions of the dominant 
hegemonic political forces of the era simply because, in its zeal to win big 
ratings and big profits, it gravitates toward what it believes is popular. As 
a consequence, it tends to reproduce and reinforce the dominant ethos, 
ideology, and policies (48). 
Kellner's principal contribution to mass communication theory is his 
recognition that the primordial operating principal in television-news production 
is "getting attention" in order to raise ratings. Therefore, notions of civic 
responsibility play only a secondary -- and usually minor -- role in production 
decisions on how to cover public policy. Indeed, television "increases trends 
toward privatization and helps destroy a more participatory public sphere by 
keeping its viewers in their own homes, away from other people" (Kellner, 124). 
As a result, the consumer gets the idea that he is excluded from, not included in, 
public discourse . (This is similar to Dayan and Katz' theory, according to which 
media and the government contrive to keep the citizenry at home, so they cannot 
become politically involved.) 
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Now let us consider the work of Daniel Hallin, another critical theorist. 
Hallin is particularly important with respect to our query into the journalistic 
coverage of Laos, because he is one of the handful of principal researchers to have 
analyzed systematically the relationship between the U. S. media and the Vietnam 
War (another is the military historian William Hammond, mentioned previously). 
In The "Uncensored " War: The Media and Vietnam (1986) and We Keep America 
on Top of the World: Television and the Public Sphere (1994), Hallin persuasively 
shows that in Vietnam, reporters essentially followed the U. S. Government line 
until very late in the war -- indeed, generally until after the Tet Offensive of 1968. 
(This also is precisely the argument advanced by Hammond. The application of 
this finding will be made clear in chapters 2 and 3.) How he arrives at this 
conclusion requires some explanation. 
Hallin begins by declaring his discomfort with American journalism' s 
commitment to "professionalism," because "professionalism develops along with 
a closer relationship with the state" ( 1994: 7). He writes that major news 
organizations no longer have particular ethnic, religious, party, or religious 
affiliations as they did at the end of the 19th century. At the same time, the media 
are more entangled with economic institutions and the state. Therefore, " the news 
media have to be seen as a hybrid institution, at once economic, political, and 
cultural-professional" (1994: 5). 
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The issue is particularly germane with respect to reporting on national 
security and foreign affairs: "The irony is we have far more information about 
what government is doing, but the picture of the world the media gives us is more 
than ever tied with official views" ( 1994: 5). This state of affairs is harmful for 
several reasons: First, the culture of professionalism is largely hostile to politics, 
preferring technical and administrative expertise or cynical detachment to 
engagement in the public sphere. Such a clinical approach runs counter to 
Hallin' s belief that journalism should be committed to justice and compassion as 
well as to accuracy. Secondly, as Hallin states more explicitly in The 
"Uncensored War, '" such professionalization has "granted to political authorities 
certain positive rights of access to the news and accepting for the most part the 
language, agenda and perspectives of the political establishment" (1986: 8). Thus, 
he writes: 
The reporters who went to Southeast Asia were schooled in a set of 
journalistic practices, which, among other things, ensured that the news 
would reflect, if not always the views of those at the very top of the 
American political hierarchy, at least the perspectives of American 
officialdom generally ( 1986: 8). 
What is the implication for the making of foreign policy, particularly in 
wartime or a crisis? For Hallin, the media participate in the "construction of 
political meaning and formation of opinion. The model is a conversation" (1994: 
10). A real conversation, it would appear, would give the media a role in forming 
policy as well. But ironically, Hallin asserts, such a result is not the case. The 
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behavior of media is dependent on the degree of consensus among elites. When 
consensus is strong, the media are passive. When the elites are divided, the media 
become more active, more diverse in their points of view, and more difficult to 
manage. 
Hallin argues, for example, that the anti-establishment media view of the 
Vietnam War got under way only after the foreign-policy elites themselves began 
to disagree with President Nixon's policy. Television then began to reflect what 
already was reality: an escalating opposition to the policy, beginning in the spring 
of 1967 and accelerating by mid-1969 (1994: 11). Hallin's analysis of the media's 
reaction to Vietnam recalls our previous discussion of the Iran hostage crisis. In 
sum, the media picked up neither crisis until after the elites already had lost 
control of the policy. 
The central value of Hallin's work for our purpose is that, instead of 
asking the usual question as to why the United States "lost Vietnam," Hallin 
focuses on the question of how the United States got into Vietnam in the first 
place. He concludes that it was due to the "enormous strength of the Cold War 
consensus in the early 1960s, shared by journalists and policymakers alike" (1986: 
9). Identifying a phenomenon he terms "Cold War news management," Hallin 
finds that Washington authorities were able to "define or frame the situation in 
such a way that its actions appeared beyond political controversy" (19). Indeed, 
according to Hallin, the president' s power to control the news in Vietnam rested 
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on two factors: the prevalent Cold War ideology, and ironically, the professional 
routines ofjournalism. 
For example, few reporters spoke Vietnamese. They were, therefore, 
overwhelmingly reliant on official, mainly American, sources. Most also tended 
to define "news" as a series of discrete events. Hence, battles and "body counts" 
were over-reported to the detriment of analysis of the underlying root of the 
conflict.4 The war consistently was portrayed as pitting Western-backed freedom 
fighters against Communist invaders; the nationalist dimension arising out of 
decades of repressive French rule was totally overlooked. Nor did the U. S. press 
corps begin to use the term "civil war" in reference to the Indochina conflict until 
1965 (1986 : 89). Moreover, "once the American troops were committed to 
combat in large numbers, television coverage focused overwhelmingly on one 
central story: American boys in action" (129). In sum, the conflict between the 
press and the govenm1ent in the early 1960s was an argument over "tactics, not 
principles" (28). The journalists did not challenge the assumption that the United 
States needed to be involved in Vietnam. Perhaps even more disturbingly, the 
journalists never took any other framework into account: 
An ideology defines not only what people see, but also what they do not 
see. What Americans saw in Vietnam was aggression; what they did not 
see, and could not see, given the political concepts available to them, was 
revolution (Hallin, 1986: 54 ). 
Similarly, the media displayed a lack of critical stance with respect to the 
1990 Gulf War, Hallin writes. They did so because the first Bush administration 
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had contrived a careful campaign to persuade both the Congress and the public of 
the rightness of its cause. Thus, once soldiers' lives were on the line, television 
and the public rallied to the president's policy. In the Gulf as well as in Vietnam, 
the media failed in what Hallin believes should be their primary role: "sparking 
active public participation in deciding the direction of public policy" (1994, 35). 
Hallin is not the only researcher to assert the idea that American 
journalism ought not to have accepted passively the United States' involvement in 
Indochina. Knightley, for example, argues that U. S. media representatives not 
only avoided commenting on the morality of American intervention but also stood 
idly by while atrocities were being committed. Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky go even further , essentially attributing what they term war crimes in 
Indochina to the press corps as well as to U. S. policy makers. Specifically with 
regard to Laos, they allege: 
It would have been impossible to wage a brutal war against South Vietnam 
and the rest of Indochina, leaving a legacy of misery and destruction that 
may never be overcome, if the media had not rallied to the cause, 
portraying murderous aggression as a defense of freedom, and only 
opening the doors to tactical disagreement when the costs to the interests 
they represented became too high (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, xv). 
The implications for our analysis are clear. The media do have a large 
impact on foreign policy, but perhaps not the impact that most Americans, 
including foreign-policy elites, have always assumed. The ability of the press to 
perform a normative liberal pluralist function is questionable. The relationship 
between the media and the state is more ambiguous, complex and contradictory 
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than American civic texts would suggest. The bottom line: the modern journalist 
is dependent on the state, a reality most obvious during coverage of foreign policy. 
To put it another way: 
It was a popular view in the post-World War II period that the "age of 
ideology" had passed in America, replaced by the spirit of objective 
inquiry and political pluralism and pragmatism. And it was true that no 
great philosophical debates over the direction of public policy were taking 
place. This silence, however, represented not the end of ideology, but the 
triumph of a single ideology over all competitors. It was an age of 
ideological consensus, and this was true above all in foreign policy. The 
world view of the Cold War dominated American thinking about 
international affairs so totally during these years that it became not merely 
dangerous but virtually impossible for most Americans to question or to 
step outside it. Americans simply knew no other language for thinking or 
for communicating about the world. The journalists were no exception 
(Hallin, 1986: 50). 
With that point uppermost in our minds, let us now turn to one of U.S. 
journalism's darkest moments, its coverage of American involvement in Laos. 
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Notes to Chapter I 
1 See the annotated bibliography for full citations. 
2 Presumably, the teclmology has since further amplified this trend. It goes 
almost without saying that the abi lity to transmit news in "real time" was the stuff 
of which the so-called "CNN factor" was made, and which today makes the 
globalization of the World Wide Web such an exciting and controversial 
development, both for journalism and policy elites. 
3 These trends have only intensified since Cohen wrote about them. The 
news hole is much smaller today than it was 30 years ago, and the consolidation of 
independent news organizations into so-called "infotaimnent" conglomerates has 
further reduced the focus on foreign news. 
4 Hallin helpfully reminds us that so-called "op-ed pieces" were not a 
regular feature of American newspapers until very late in the Vietnan1 conflict. 
Instead, the major papers had regular Washington columnists, many of whom 
were known for their coziness to officialdom. 
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Chapter 2 
The United States at War in Laos 
More even than Cambodia, Laos was used by both principal protagonists with a 
callous disregard for those caught up in the fighting. The country's territorial 
integrity was violated with impunity by both North Vietnam and the United 
States, in the name ofrevolution or freedom, neither of which had much meaning 
for the great majority of the Lao people. What was portrayed by opposing sides 
as a heroic struggle against imperialism or communism was a drawn-out misery 
both for those directly involved, and for those whose only escape was to become 
refugees. 
-- Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos 
It is not my aim to describe here the detailed particulars of the tactics, 
engagements, or grand strategy of the American war in Laos. However, in order 
to make plain what happened to U. S. journalism in Laos, it is important first to 
describe what was happening in Laos during the larger Indochina conflict. 
Although the scholarship on this topic is growing with each passing year, the 
details are still far less !mown to the U. S. public than the facts about the war in 
Vietnam. This chapter will lay out the basic historical groundwork for the reader, 
as a prologue to the analysis of the actual journalism of the period, which follows 
in Chapter 3. 1 
--- -
The End of France's Empire 
At the end of World War II, the United States decided to support the 
Position of France at the expense of the latter's colonies in Indochina. Although 
President Roosevelt had been sympathetic to the aspirations of the peoples in 
southeast Asia, the politics of the time made it impossible for his successor, Harry 
Truman, to pursue a policy of other than support for France, Washington's 
important wartime ally. Moreover, the Cold War was beginning, and some of the 
1110st rigid anti-Communists in the U.S. Government were in charge ofindochina 
policy at the State Department. They had their reasons. Key events in the period 
that consolidated the hard-line American posture were the Soviet blockade of 
Berlin in the spring of 1948, the Communist takeover in China in October 1949, 
and the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950. 
Therefore, even as it became clear that France was losing her position in 
1nd0china, the United States intervened with military assistance to make sure that 
Paris remained in control of what otherwise could become a Communist 
stronghold in Southeast Asia. In 1950 the United States signed a treaty with 
France providing significant military and economic assistance to her Southeast 
Asia colonial possessions __ Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Between 1950 and 
1954, it is estimated, the United States paid most of the costs of France's war 
against the armies of Ho Chi Minh. 
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This war became a costly bloodletting for the French, and one for which 
they could see no end. By the spring of 1954 the state of domestic politics in 
France was in such turmoil as a result of the conflict that the new premier, Pierre 
Mendes-France, decided that he would have to negotiate a withdrawal of French 
forces from Indochina. Ironically, this was precisely the moment when the United 
States, whose policy was firmly in the hands of Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, wanted to stand firm against the Vietminh. In a resulting public argument 
between Dulles and the French, it became clear that Paris was no longer willing to 
pay the price of shoring up anti-Communism in Indochina. Mendes-France 
indicated his desire for an international conference to negotiate an end to the war. 
The Vietminh, aware of France's increasingly shaky domestic position, 
seized the moment to inflict one last, humiliating defeat on the French. In July 
1954, even as diplomats were meeting at Geneva in negotiations, news came of 
the fall of Dien Bien Phu, located at the critical gateway into northeast Laos. The 
French army fell back into Laos in disarray for a possible defense of the royal 
capital, Luang Prabang. But the Geneva Conference shortly ended the war, and 
the French would not fight again. 
Battling Communism Head On, 1955-1960 
At Geneva the negotiators decided, most famously, that Vietnam would be 
divided temporarily into two parts, with elections to be held within two years to 
decide the form of government. With respect to Laos, they decided that the tiny 
landlocked country that formed a "buffer" between Communist Vietnam and 
China to the north and pro-Western Thailand to the south should be "neutral and 
independent." Provision was made for the Pathet Lao, the then-insubstantial 
armed forces of the Lao Communist Party, to "regroup" in the northern Lao 
provinces of Phongsaly and Sam Neua. This would have important consequences, 
as we shall later see. 
With its French ally discredited, the United States now picked up the 
mantle in Indochina. Secretary of State Dulles had not signed the Geneva treaty, 
did not expect it to hold, and indeed actively worked to ensure its ultimate failure. 
In Vietnam, the Eisenhower administration began its policy of shoring up an anti-
Communist government in the South to ensure that Ho Chi Minh would not 
triumph in the eventual elections. Meanwhile in Laos th rnited tates began 
q · tl . h R 1 L Government for an eventual stand against the Pathet tile y to tram t e oya ao 
Lao. d 
· . nspectly· the Geneva Agreement specifically It would have to o so c11cw , 
fi " .. . "from establishing military bases orbade "all foreign powers except France 
in Laos."2 
U . 4 h h d only been one Foreign Service Officer p until late 195 , t ere a 
as · . . . 1 Now the first ambassador, Charles Yost, signed to Vientiane the Lao capita · 
' 
Was stationed there and between 1955 and 1960, the United States moved to beef 
' 
u · 1 L Government (RLG).
3 It began P Its personnel and its influence on the Roya ao 
b . . . M' · (USOM) to administer Y estabhshrng the United States Operations ission 
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economic assistance. A companion military assistance office, the so-called 
Program Evaluation Office (PEO) soon followed. In order to downplay the 
military nature of the PEO, the U.S. Govenm1ent staffed it with reserve and 
retired military personnel who wore no uniforms. 
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As it happened, Laos experienced a severe drought in 1955. Civil Air 
Transport (CAT), an airline owned by the American Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), was brought in to drop rice and salt to victims in remote areas. By 1957, 
CAT and the U. S. Embassy had signed a formal contract and a C-47 transport 
aircraft was based at Vientiane. In 1959, Washington introduced covert, mobile 
U. S. Special Forces training teams into Laos. By 1959, there were approximately 
400 U. S. official employees of one description or another working in Laos.4 
With respect to the internal political situation, by now the U. S. 
Government was also nnming a shadow parallel administration and pumping large 
sums of money into Laos. The money inevitably was put to questionable purposes, 
including the purchase of Mercedes-Benzes and ostentatious villas for the ruling 
elite. In 1959 Laos was receiving more aid than any other foreign country as the 
U. S. pressed to effect an increasingly hard-line Lao position vis-a-vis 
Communism. So corrupt had the aid program become, however, that in late 1959 
the U. S. Congress began to investigate the large sums of money being expended 
in Laos, and to demand accountability for them. 5 
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The 1958 elections in Laos meanwhile had produced a result not at all to 
the liking of the United States government: Communists won 13 of 59 seats in the 
National Assembly. In response, Washington froze its economic assistance, upon 
which the RLG had become almost totally dependent. This forced the neutralist 
prime minister, Souvanna Phouma, to resign. U. S. aid resumed only after a more 
anti-Communist prime minister, _Phoui Sananikone, formed a new govenunent. 
The precedent had been set for changes of governments precipitated by 
U.S. interference. In December 1959, right-wing military leaders urged on by the 
CIA overtlu·ew Phoui Sananikone. This action was shortly followed by another 
coup led by Captain Kong Le, a young U. S. -trained paratrooper who sought to 
return Souvanna Phouma to power. The United States then supported General 
Phoumi Nosavan in a counter-coup. Phoumi installed Prince Boun Oum Na 
Champasak, of the southern royal family, as prime minister. 
While all this was happening, various factions inside the Royal Lao 
Govenunent continued to seek to outmaneuver each other for American moral and 
monetary backing. One effective way to do this, they found , was to draw repeated 
attention to the Communist tlu·eat from North Vietnam. Thus in 1959 a tentative 
push by the North Vietnamese Army (NV A) into Sam Neua and Phongsaly 
provinces was amplified into claims by the RLG of a large-scale invasion. 
Although the invasion was never proved, it received ample coverage in the 
American press and provoked a United Nations investigation. The end result was 
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more posturing by Washington and an even more aggressive "anti-Red" stance by 
the U. S. Embassy in Laos.6 
Not surprisingly, both Peking and Moscow were increasingly concerned by 
U. S. activities in Laos, which they saw as threatening their own positions. In 
December 1960 Moscow flew support flights to the neutralist and Pathet Lao 
forces fighting the armed forces of the Royal Lao Government. The Pathet Lao 
guerrillas in the mountains of northeastern Laos were increasingly assisted not 
only by North Vietnamese but also by Russian, Czech, and Chinese advisers. In 
turn, the United States grew increasingly alarmed about an expanding network of 
Chinese-built roads in the north, particularly in Oudomxai, Luang Namtha, and 
Phongsaly provinces. These developments tended to reinforce American policy 
makers' thinking that Laos fit the bill as a Cold War "domino." 
"Neutrality" and a Secret War, 1961-1963 
By early 1961, when President Eisenhower passed off the "Lao problem" 
to his successor, Jolm F. Kennedy, he warned that Laos would be the new 
administration ' s biggest foreign-policy headache. Indeed, in the early days of his 
administration Kem1edy, egged on by the Pentagon, came to the brink of sending 
U. S. troops into Laos. Had the invasion of Cuba that April succeeded, he might 
have done so. Instead, in the wake of the disastrous Bay of Pigs, he came to the 
conclusion that a similar course in Laos would bring the United States into direct 
confrontation with the Soviet Union and/or China. Moreover, he correctly 
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understood that the Lao, a famously gentle and nonassertive people, did not mind 
greatly if their leadership reflected a range of political ideologies. 
Thus Kennedy moved to change the long-standing policy of support for a 
staunch anti-Communist government in Vientiane. He returned to the original 
Geneva idea of a "neutral" Laos. He put his new Asia envoy, former New York 
Governor W. Averell Harriman, in charge of working out a solution to the civil 
war in Laos that would not involve the commitment of American ground troops. 
Ironically, the new Ke1medy team now focused on strengthening the 
administration of Souvaima Phouma, whom Eisenhower's people had worked so 
hard to discredit and keep from power. 
Meanwhile, the U. S. involvement in Laos was moving into a different 
realm altogether. American officials in Washington and Vientiane by 1960 had 
come to realize that all the money they had poured into the Royal Lao army in the 
late 1950s had produced no tangible result. The army, made up chiefly of lowland 
Lao "Lomn" (the traditional name for the Lao of ethno-linguistic T'ai Kadai stock 
who occupy the Mekong River Valley) had come to naught. 7 The Lao Loum, 
they found, are not natural fighters. 
Thus in late December 1960 CIA case officer Bill Lair met for the first 
time with Hmong tribal leader Vang Pao.8 The Hmong, an ethnic group of 
Chinese origin that had moved into Laos only in the late 1800s, had a better 
reputation for war making thai1 did the Lao Loum. Vang Pao had proved this 
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maxim by fighting with the French first against the Japanese in World War II and 
later against the nationalist Vietnamese. He agreed to help the CIA form a 
guerrilla army to fight against the North Vietnamese Army. 
The idea of a limited covert effort rather than a full-scale assault on Laos 
appealed to President Kennedy. With the CIA in charge on the ground and 
Harriman running the policy from Washington, Kermedy could turn to more 
pressing matters, including the increasingly complex situation in Vietnam. At 
Harriman' s instigation, a new international conference for Laos was convened in 
Geneva in July 1962; there the tiny country's "neutrality" was reconfirmed. A 
cease-fire was arranged, as was a coalition government representing the various 
political factions. All foreign troops were supposed to depart Laos by October of 
that year, and American military advisers -- approximately 1,100 of them -- did 
so. When their North Vietnamese counterparts (estimated at up to 8,000 men) did 
not, American policy makers were faced with a new dilemma. They could either 
call Ho Chi Minh's bluff and call attention to his violation of the accords, or they 
could play his game. 
For various reasons to which we will return later, the U. S. policy makers 
chose to play the game. They decided to fight a covert proxy war, using Vang 
Pao's tribal irregulars to prevent the Pathet Lao and NVA from gaining any more 
ground inside Laos. By the summer of 1962, the CIA had constructed a full-
fledged base of operations for the Hmong army, including an airfield, at Long 
Tieng in the mountains of Xieng Khouang Province. Over time, Long Tieng 
became a thriving city of more than 50,000 persons, the second largest in Laos 
after Vientiane. Its existence was classified, as far as the U. S. Embassy was 
concerned; indeed, it was not supposed to exist at all. 
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Thus began the so-called "secret war," which the U. S. public would not 
know about in detail for several more years. But inside Laos it was not all that 
secret, and it was certainly no secret to either the North Vietnamese or its allies in 
Peking and Moscow. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma acquiesced in the build-
up of the CIA-led Hmong army, realizing that he had no other choice. He had 
good personal reasons for hoping that the Great Powers would eventually leave 
Laos alone; his own half-brother, Souphanouvong, was the titular head of the 
Pathet Lao, and Souvanna seemed to believe genuinely that the differing Lao 
factions, whom he regarded as a large family, could accommodate each other. Yet 
Souvanna knew that his own survival, and that of Laos, depended on skillfully 
navigating the treacherous political games then being played by the United States, 
China, and the Soviet Union. 
A New Kind of Ambassador 
By July 1962, a new ambassador, a Kennedy appointee, was in Laos. 
Leonard Unger had served in Thailand and had close ties to the Royal Thai 
Government. One of Unger's first moves was to set up a new unit under which 
covert U.S. -Thai assistance to the Royal Lao Government could be funneled. 
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This was the so-called "Requirements Office," which was put under the nominal 
control of the Vientiane-based headquarters of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). 
Unger also came to Vientiane equipped with something his predecessors 
had not, a letter from President Kennedy putting him in charge of all elements of 
the U. S. Govenm1ent operating in Laos. This was a precedent stemming both 
from the Bay of Pigs debacle and from the disarray inside U.S. Embassy 
Vientiane during the Eisenhower administration, when the CIA and the U. S. 
military attaches pursued their own policies regardless of the intentions oflke's 
ambassadors. 
With Kennedy having considered and then discarded the notion of a 
traditional military intervention, and with Unger now in complete control of the 
embassy and charged with implementing directives from Washington, the stage 
was set for a new kind of war -- one conducted under the auspices of the U.S. 
ambassador rather than the Pentagon. The CIA, USAID, and the military attaches 
inside the embassy now came together under the ambassador to support the 
Hmong army in the field and to prop up the Royal Lao regime in Vientiane. 
Between 1964 and 1967, the Hmong faced off time and again against 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese fighters and acquitted themselves admirably. 
Although they did not decisively defeat the Communist forces, they were able to 
protect incursions past the Plain, south of which lay Luang Prabang, Vientiane, 
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and the majority of the Lao Loum population. The Communists would press their 
advantage during the annual dry season from October to May, but always had to 
fall back during the rainy season, when their vehicles and materiel bogged down 
in the mud. The Hmong were most successful during the early years, when the 
Americans employed them mainly for hit-and-run, guerrilla-style missions. They 
were less successful in the waning years of the war, when their CIA advisers tried 
to turn them into a conventional army to stem the growing North Vietnamese 
presence in Sam Neua (now Houaphan) and Phongsaly provinces. 
Indeed, over the years, the Hmong army grew to more than 40,000 men 
( and boys as young as 10-12 years of age), all receiving a small salary from the 
CIA. Since their participation in the war disrupted their traditional lifestyle of 
slash-and-burn agriculture, it fell to the U. S. Government to feed their families. 
The CIA proprietary airline, now named Air America, played a key role in 
dropping rice and other commodities to Hmong villages in the mountains. 
USAID set up a refugee-relief headquarters at Sam Thong, near the CIA base of 
Long Thieng, from which humanitarian assistance to Hmong displaced by the 
fighting could be coordinated. Increasingly, Air America was drawn into 
providing air support and search-and-rescue missions for Hmong guerrillas on the 
ground. 
In June 1963, the United States presented a "gift" of six T-28 propeller-
driven fighter-bombers to the Royal Lao Air Force. But since the Lao appeared to 
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be less than willing or competent to fly the planes, Americans stationed at U. S. 
bases in Thailand were soon put into the pilots' seats. Meanwhile, U. S. pilots in 
reconnaissance planes disguised as Royal Lao aircraft overflew the Plain of Jars, 
observing movements of the enemy on the ground. Predictably, the next stage of 
the war would be fought from the air, with Americans directly in charge. 
The Air War, 1964-1973 
The American involvement which had started in such an inconspicuous 
way in the early 1950s had, by the mid-1960s, become a fairly large-scale effort. 
Americans were enmeshed in a shooting war in Laos, one with complicated civil 
and international dimensions. Indeed, the situation had now developed thus: 
This secret war was really four wars, administratively distinct and only 
partially coordinated. One was the conflict fought by the Royal Lao Army 
.. . which was generally limited to the areas surrounding the principal 
towns. Another was the vigorous, deadly war for survival by the Meos 
[Hmong] under the close supervision and support of the CIA. Third was 
the air war in northern Laos, under the code name of Barrel Roll , at first 
shared with the Laotian Air Force, but gradually dominated by the 
Americans. Fourth was the air war in the southern panhandle of Laos, 
under the code name of Steel Tiger, along the Ho Chi Minh trails to South 
Vietnam; this war was a direct adjunct to the struggle in that neighboring 
nation. The Ambassador had access to information about these military 
operations and a veto over certain plans (Stevenson, The End of Nowhere, 
2 10). 
How matters arrived at this state requires some explanation. By early 
1964 the coalition govenm1ent of rightists, neutralists, and leftists that had been in 
place in Laos since the 1962 Geneva agreements was in danger of collapse. It was 
abruptly put to death when two Royal army generals again decided to assert the 
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right wing's desire to monopolize power. The generals launched another coup 
attempt, but this one did not succeed in the manner of the coups of 1960-1961 , 
mainly because the Americans intervened to save Prime Minister Souvaima 
Phouma this time. Thereafter, Souvanna aligned himself more explicitly with the 
rightists and the Americans; whatever his private thoughts, he could see which 
way the political winds were blowing. 
The Americans were now arguing that a major combined Pathet Lao-North 
Vietnamese influx was underway, and persuaded Souvanna to accept an escalation 
of the war.9 As indicated previously, from December 1963 on, U.S . Special 
Forces in Thailand began to train Lao pilots in reconnaissance work. And in May 
1964, American pilots began reco1maissance overflights of their own, of both the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos and the Plain of Jars in the northeast. 
No sooner had President Johnson authorized these activities (Ke1medy 
having been assassinated the previous November) than the Pathet Lao shot down 
two American planes over the Plain. Predictably, the United States sent in a 
squadron of F-100 fighter-bombers to retaliate, and initiated a new policy of 
armed escorts for all reco1maissance flights. However, instead of dealing frankly 
with the press about these developments, the U. S. mission began a public-affairs 
policy of strict denial. Later, U. S. officials would assert that the press policy was 
at the request of Souvanna Phouma. However, it clearly also served the American 
interest of not publicizing that the U.S. as well as the North Vietnamese and the 
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Pathet Lao were also in violation of the Geneva agreements. (By contrast, during 
this same period, the U. S. mission in Saigon undertook a new "maximum 
candor" policy with respect to release of information to the correspondents.) 
Growing American Involvement in Vietnam 
It is also important to note corresponding developments with respect to 
Vietnam during this period. By early 1964, Washington had become deeply 
concerned about the growing movement of North Vietnamese materiel and 
personnel along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a latticework of foot trails and dirt roads 
that transited the southeastern panhandle of Laos into South Vietnam. Also, in 
August that year the reported North Vietnamese attacks on an American ship in 
the Tonkin Gulf gave President Johnson the excuse he needed -- and permission 
from Congress -- to intervene more directly in Vietnam. 10 He launched the first 
American air strikes against the North, and over the next two years, he sent 
500,000 American soldiers to South Vietnam. This in tum led to an increase in 
the number of U.S. correspondents in Saigon; with the Americanization of the 
Vietnam conflict, fewer reporters were interested in Laos. (This will be treated 
more extensively in the next chapter.) 
Later in the year, William Sullivan, a young Foreign Service Officer and 
protege of Averell Harriman who had played an instrumental role in working out 
the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, became U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane. 
64 
The first U.S. direct bombing of military targets in nmiheast Laos ("Barrel Roll") 
began almost immediately, in December, with Sullivan assuming charge of the air 
war. As Stevenson tells us, "Bombing had become an accepted tactic by the end 
of 1964" (208); "once begun, air operations took on a life and momentum of their 
own" (216) . 
In early 1965 Sullivan received permission from Souvanna Phouma to 
bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This escalation dovetailed with the corresponding 
air war over Vietnam. By 1966 most of the bombing runs over northern Laos 
originated at a major new U. S. -built facility at Udorn Thani, Thailand, and a 
dozen other American bases in that country. Meanwhile, B-52 bombers based out 
of Guam flew saturation bombing sorties over the Trail. 11 
Inevitably, it was found that American forward air controllers (F ACS) 
were needed to direct the bombers to their targets; the F ACS, who called 
themselves "the Ravens," were covert U. S. Air Force aviators who wore civilian 
clothes in case their planes were shot down inside Laos. But it was Ambassador 
Sullivan who gave the thumbs up or thumbs down for each mission, a situation 
highly unusual in U. S. military history. There is much evidence that the military 
brass from General William Westmoreland on down were unhappy with the 
situation and repeatedly sought, although usually in vain, to limit Sullivan's role. 
However in 1966, the U. S. Air Force did manage to persuade 
Washington, over Sullivan's objections, to establish a tactical air-navigation 
65 
system (T ACAN) inside Laos for the purpose of directing bombing runs against 
Hanoi. The system was built atop Phou Pha Thi, a mile-high mountain in 
northeastern Laos near the Communist stronghold at Sam Neua and the 
Vietnamese border. However, for various reasons the system never worked as 
well as it should have, and served only to alert the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese 
of covert American activity next to the border. On March 11 , 1968, Vietnamese 
sappers overran Phou Pa Thi, confiscating much of the sensitive equipment and 
engaging in hand-to-hand fighting with American pers01mel, some of whom were 
unarmed civilians. The event resulted in 11 Americans missing and presumed 
dead. But since the U. S. officially was not involved in Laos, their families could 
not be told the real circumstances. 12 
Two weeks later, President Johnson announced that he would not seek 
reelection, and offered a partial bombing halt and talks with Hanoi. Ironically, 
with the bombing temporarily suspended over Northern Vietnam, American 
bombers began to unload all their excess ordnance over Laos. Thereafter sorties 
over Laos doubled what they had been only a year earlier, and by mid-1969, 300 
sorties were being flown into Laos on a daily basis. An intensification of such 
magnitude meant that the air war was increasingly difficult to control, and 
accidental bombings of civilian targets began to occur with some frequency. 
By the summer of 1969 yet another American ambassador was in 
Vientiane. He was G. McMurtrie "Mac" Godley, an appointee of the new 
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president, Richard M. Nixon. Godley by all accounts relished the unlikely role 
thrust upon him, that of a quasi-general responsible for decisions affecting the 
lives of combatants and civilians alike. Soon after Godley took over, the rules of 
engagement for American bombers relaxed considerably, and civilian targets were 
no longer completely off-limits. Apparently in response to a request from Premier 
Savanna Phouma, Godley called in the first B-52 bombing strikes over civilian 
areas in the northeast, in response to a large-scale North Vietnamese offensive on 
the Plain of Jars in January 1970. American bombers completely destroyed the 
strategic village of Xieng Khouang Ville in a matter of days. According to reports 
that appeared first in the European press, not a house was left standing there. 
The bombing of Laos continued, albeit at a reduced rate, right to the end of 
the American war in Vietnam (in Cambodia, it went on even longer). It continued 
despite rising antiwar demonstrations inside the United States, hearings conducted 
by the U. S. Congress, secret peace talks with Hanoi, and the pullout of American 
forces from Vietnam. Only after the war did it become clear that during the watch 
of ambassadors Sullivan and Godley, but particularly the latter, American 
firepower was responsible for the wholesale destruction of thousands of Lao 
homes and villages and the killing of untold numbers of civilians. More 
ordnance was dropped over Laos -- 2.1 million tons -- than over Germany during 
World War II. And the bombing story is not over, as unexploded ordnance 
continues to kill and maim Laotian civilians to this date, at the rate of 
approximately 100 casualties per year. 13 
The Beginning of the End 
As we have seen, U.S. policy in Laos became ever more linked with the 
Vietnam war in the late 1960s, particularly as American military planners grew 
increasingly vexed in their failed attempts to halt North Vietnamese infiltration 
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Paradoxically, by this time Washington policy 
makers were under increasing public and congressional pressure to bring home 
American soldiers and to "Vietnamize" the war. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's 
national security adviser and later secretary of state, began secret negotiations 
with Hanoi to that end in early 1970. 
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Meanwhile, as a consequence of news leaks about the extent of American 
military activities in Laos and Cambodia, in March 1970 President Nixon had to 
acknowledge that the United States had been involved in Laos for many years. 
He misreported some aspects of the situation and failed to provide particulars on 
others (a serious misstep to be discussed more fully in the next chapter), but in the 
end the Senate reacted by placing limits on his power to wage war in Indochina. 
With these new restrictions in place, a contemplated U.S. invasion of 
southern Laos could not be implemented. However, in February 1971 , South 
Vietnamese troops with U. S. air support began ground incursions into Laos in a 
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last, desperate attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Operation Dewey Canyon 
II). But the South Vietnamese, whose reputation as fighters was as wretched as 
that of the Lao Loum, turned and ran. Photographs of South Vietnamese soldiers 
hanging to the struts of American helicopters caused much embarrassment to the 
Nixon administration. The operation was a debacle on every count, with the 
South Vietnamese suffering heavy casualties and the U. S. losing hundreds of 
aircraft. Four journalists covering the invasion also were killed when their South 
Vietnamese helicopter went down. 
Later that year, the last series of battles began in the northeastern theater of 
Laos. Ten thousand Hmong and Thai fighters attempted to defend "Skyline 
Ridge," which guarded the approaches to the CIA base at Long Tieng and the 
refugee center at Sam Thong, from several battalions of the North Vietnamese 
army. The battle seesawed off and on for six months, with the North Vietnamese 
using Soviet-supplied T-34 tanks and long-range 133-millimeter guns. At one 
point the North Vietnamese penetrated Long Tieng. But the Hmong and Thai 
held fast, and the Vietnamese eventually retreated to wait out the monsoon. The 
Hmong had staved off the Communists once more -- albeit only with considerable 
assistance from the Thai -- but it was to be a bittersweet, and final, victory. 
America Loses Interest, 1973-1975 
On January 27, 1973, President Nixon announced that the United States 
had signed a peace treaty with North Vietnam. Laos having been excluded from 
-
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the secret talks along with South Vietnam and Cambodia, Souvanna Phouma was 
on his own in negotiating an end to his conflict with the Pathet Lao and Hanoi. In 
February 1973, under pressure from Kissinger, Souvanna agreed to a cease-fire 
with the Pathet Lao, but one without even the fig leaf of the "neutrality" 
provisions of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements. Kissinger assured Souvanna 
that Washington intended to help him establish and maintain a stable coalition 
government with the Pathet Lao, but these turned out to be empty promises. 
Vang Pao' s Hmong irregulars and his Pathet Lao adversaries were 
supposed to be merged into the Royal Lao army, although Pathet Lao violations of 
the cease-fire and Vang Pao's own stubbornness led to continued fighting between 
the two sides for several more months. Nevertheless, coalition government 
between neutralists and Communists returned to Laos for a third and final time in 
April 1974. Prince Souphanouvong, the titular head of the Pathet Lao and half-
brother to Souvanna Phouma, received a hero's welcome upon his arrival in 
Vientiane to join the coalition. 
For all practical purposes, this marked the end of direct U. S. involvement 
in Lao affairs. Air America withdrew its planes and pilots by the required 
deadline in June 1974, and CIA funding for the war officially ended on September 
30 of that year. Meanwhile, in the United States, President Nixon resigned in 
humiliation over the so-called "Watergate" affair; as far as America was 
concerned, Indochina was becoming a distant memory. The last American 
soldiers had departed Vietnam in the spring of 1973. In January 1975, when the 
North Vietnamese launched a new assault against the South, the U. S. Congress 
refused to reauthorize American involvement. The clear American disinterest 
emboldened the Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge, in Laos and Cambodia, 
respectively, to press their advantage on the ground. 
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The fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon to the Communists in early 1975 
meant that the coalition in Laos could not last much longer. Indeed, the Pathet 
Lao advanced on Long Tieng a final time, in early May. Vang Pao previously had 
refused to abandon his mountain redoubt, but he realized at this point that his only 
options were to flee or to face certain death at the hands of either the Pathet Lao or 
his own men, who were increasingly demoralized and angry at being deserted by 
the Americans. 
The CIA, who had assisted in the haphazard departure of the last 
Americans from the Saigon embassy, organized a last-minute evacuation of at 
least some of their Hmong allies. On May 12-14, 1975, the CIA airlifted General 
Vang Pao and 2,500 Hmong to safety in Thailand. But tens of thousands of other 
Hmong were left behind and had to escape by foot over the mountains south to 
Vientiane. Many did not survive the ensuing exodus to Thailand. As the last C-
4 7 transport planes took off, Long Tieng fell to advancing Pathet Lao troops. By 
August, Vientiane also had fallen. The Pathet Lao took over the former USAID 
compound with its neat rows of ranch houses, swimming pool, and school 
-
gymnasium. And on December 2, the Pathet Lao accepted the abdication of the 
King of Laos, and declared the Lao People's Democratic Republic. 
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Although the Pathet Lao were not as ruthless as their counterparts in 
Cambodia, they executed many soldiers of the former regime and sent the higher-
ranking political and military figures to so-called "seminar," or re-education 
camps. Indeed, the king and queen and their son, the heir to the throne, died in 
detention while under house arrest near Sam Neua. The U. S. funding largesse of 
previous decades suddenly evaporated, helping to fuel a near economic collapse of 
the new regime. Meanwhile, over the subsequent months and years, nearly 
300,000 Hmong and Lao who had supported the Royalists and the Americans fled 
to Thailand, where they endured horrific conditions in refugee camps before being 
permitted to resettle in other countries. Their exodus and resettlement began a 
new chapter in the interconnected histories of the United States and Laos. But 
that is another story. 
-
Notes to Chapter 2 
1 
My main sources for this chapter are Castle, At War in the Shadow of 
Vietnam; Dommen, Conflict in Laos; Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos; 
Stevenson, The End of Nowhere; Warner, Shooting at the Moon; Stuaii-Fox, 
History of Laos; and Karnow, Vietnam. 
2 Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954, 1969. 
3 The three ambassadors to Laos under the Eisenhower administration 
were Charles Yost, 1954-1956; J. Graham Pai·sons, 1956-1958; and Horace 
Smith, 1958-1960. For a study of the bureaucratic infighting in Washington ai1d 
at U.S. Embassy Vientiane, as well as the machinations between the two, see 
Stevenson's brilliant The End of Nowhere. 
4 William Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974," 1995. 
5 See House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, 
U. S. Aid Operations in Laos, 1959. 
6 The panic over supposed North Vietnamese troops can be explained in 
part by the fact that the NV A had come into Laos previously in 1953, in 
preparation for the attack on Dien Bien Phu. 
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7 As during the war, the Lao Loum today make up only approximately half 
of the Lao population. Non-Lao ethnic groups, of which there are more than 40, 
account for the other half. 
8 This was not, however, Vang Pao's first acquaintance with the 
Americans. It appears that he went to the Philippines in 1957 for U. S. -funded 
training. Zalin Grant moreover reports that Laos-based CIA operatives made 
initial contact with Vang Pao in 1958 or 1959. But it was with the Lair meeting in 
December 1960 that an operational agreement between the CIA and Vang Pao 
began to take shape. The intervention of Lair, who had a close personal 
relationship with King Bhumipol of Thailand, facilitated tight coordination of 
covert activities among the CIA, the Hmong, and the Royal Thai Government. 
9 The argument of a North Vietnamese invasion appears once again to 
have been based on incorrect numbers, announced by the Royal Lao Government 
and perpetuated by Western, primarily American, media outlets. Stevenson writes 
that inflated estimates of NV A invasions were publicly circulated on at least I 0 
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occasions between 1955 and 1970. He also charges that this erroneous 
information could have been stopped had the U. S. Government wanted to stop it. 
'
0 It is now common knowledge that while the first attack did occur, the 
second was fabricated in order to justify Johnson's desire to intervene. 
11 B-52 strategic bombers were not used in northeast Laos until 1969. 
Their significant military advantages were to prove a political disaster. As they 
fly at extremely high altitudes, their pilots do not actually see the targets at which 
they are aiming. This leads to a high probability of missing the intended target 
and hitting something else. 
12 The full story of Phou Pha Thi was revealed only in 1999, with the 
publication of Timothy Castle's engrossing One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 
85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam. Castle's work is based on recently 
declassified documents. It shows, among other things, how Washington's refusal 
to deal frankly with the families of the dead and missing Americans at Phou Pha 
Thi contributed to the activism of the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action 
(POW/MIA) movement. 
13 In retrospect the bombing of Laos must be seen at best as one of the 
many series of mis-steps that characterized the entire American conduct of its war 
in Indochina. At worst, it must be considered a war crime of terrible magnitude 
( even if the Royal Lao Govermnent did acquiesce in its prosecution). By any 
standard it violates the commonly understood laws of war laid out in the Geneva 
Conventions, to which the United States is a party. It has been estimated that up 
to 200,000 civilians were killed in the Laos theater of war, and an equal number 
injured. Another 10 percent of the civilian population was made homeless at one 
time or another. In 1969 alone there were approximately 300,000 internally 
displaced persons. Of course, the casualties were the result of a number of 
factors, including shelling and fighting between and among the Hmong and their 
Thai allies, the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao, and the Lao Royal Armed 
Forces. The U. S. official stance regarding war casualties and refugees in 
particular was that they were caused by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao 
"aggression." This is only a part of the story, as only the United States was 
bombing Laos on a sustained basis. Ironically, the bombing led to a humanitarian 
crisis for which the United States then had to assume responsibility, by providing 
food, clothing and shelter for the refugees. 
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Chapter 3 
Reporting the War: The Story That Got Away 
The truth is that Laos was the deepest of backwaters. It was staffed by stringers 
who filed by cable short dispatches which became even shorter news stories. 
Except during the occasional crisis when half a dozen or a dozen of us would grab 
a plane over and watch it play out. 
-- Joe Galloway, former UPI correspondent 
At the request of the Royal Laotian Government, the United States is conducting 
unarmed reconnaissance flights accompanied by armed escorts who have the right 
to return fire if fired upon. 
-- U.S. Embassy Vientiane, 
standard press guidance, 1964-1968 
The war-seeking correspondents who covered Laos in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s had other things on their minds. Laos was the second, allegedly less 
important theater of the Indochina conflict -- in fact, there was not supposed to be 
a war there at all, at least not a war involving Americans. Yet as discussed 
previously, by 1955 it was clear that the United States Government was working 
in Laos, significantly albeit quietly. Whether the U. S. press would pick up the 
story remained to be seen. 
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The Coverage in Context 
Like the Indochina conflict itself, American press coverage can be 
analyzed according to distinct stages: prior to 1965, 1965-1969 (the build-up of 
American combat troops in Vietnam), 1969-1971 (height of the domestic 
reaction), 1971-1973 (the search for peace), 1974-1975 (disinterest), 1975 (the fall 
of the three Indochinese states to Communist rule), and post-1975 (refugee 
outflux to America and elsewhere). With respect to Laos specifically, the 
coverage also can be analyzed in terms of the constraints upon journalists 
identified in the Introduction. These include the widespread fiction shared by 
journalists as well as policy makers, derivative of the Geneva Accords, that Laos 
was "neutral" in the conflict; proactive dissembling and manipulation by the U. S. 
Embassy in Laos; lack of interest in, and censorship of reports on Laos, by 
stateside editors; poor communications and infrastructure inside Laos; the lack of 
reporters with a grounding in Lao (or even French) language, history, or culture; 
and the professionalization and routines of American journalism. In this chapter, 
we will see how the press conducted itself with respect to the Laos theater of war, 
given the context and constraints within which it operated, both within and 
outside Laos. 
As indicated previously, there was no regular foreign press corps in Laos 
to speak of, at least not in the early years of American involvement in Indochina. 
-
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(Likewise, the number of accredited press in Saigon was minuscule until 
American combat soldiers arrived.) Even later, as U. S. engagement with Laos 
deepened, the reporters still considered Laos a lesser adjunct to the more 
conventional conflict in Vietnam. Most American reporters were stationed in 
Saigon, or to a lesser extent in Bangkok, Hong Kong, or Singapore. 1 They came 
to Laos only during a coup, crisis, or other discrete news "event." Similarly, once 
American troop strength in Vietnam began to decline, the number of reporters 
covering Indochina dropped off too -- ironically, even as an escalation in the U.S. 
bombing campaign against Laos and Cambodia was accelerating. 
First on the Scene: Peter Arnett 
While Agence France-Presse had maintained a bureau in Vientiane 
throughout France's struggle to maintain its empire, the American news media got 
to Laos relatively late, with the first bureaus opening there in 1959 or 1960. Peter 
Arnett was the first English-speaking, Western journalist to have more than a 
passing acquaintance with Laos. The young New Zealander had arrived in 
Southeast Asia for the first time in 1958, whereupon he was quickly picked up by 
the Bangkok World. As an apprentice to the World's American publisher, Daniel 
"Berry" Berrigan, Arnett quickly learned that the paper was a "mouthpiece for the 
U.S. Government and its aid enterprises in Thailand" (Arnett, Live from the 
Battlefield, 40). The World's connections with official Washington appear not to 
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have bothered Arnett greatly.2 Having started a joint venture with Berrigan to 
publish in Laos a companion paper to the World, he moved to Vientiane in 1960. 
He was 26 years old, and as he admits readily in his memoirs, no match for the 
political machinations already swirling in Vientiane. This was the time of 
concerted efforts by the U. S. Embassy to back rival claimants to power, with the 
U. S. Ambassador, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station, and the defense 
attaches supporting different factions. 
Arnett stayed in Vientiane on and off for two years, during which time he 
relied heavily on American Embassy contacts for advice as to what was 
newsworthy. Arnett also became personally close to the family of Phoumi 
Nosavan, the military strongman who, with financing from the CIA, came to take 
the defense ministry in the second coalition government in Laos in 1962. By the 
time Arnett moved on, to take a position with the Associated Press in Saigon, he 
realized that he had gotten out of Laos just in the nick of time, while he still had 
some shreds of journalistic integrity left. 
Besides Arnett, the Western media in Laos in the early years was 
represented by other young, non-American stringers who held other jobs in order 
to make ends meet. For example, the Australian Martin Stuart-Fox and the Briton 
Tim Page filed stories for UPI while simultaneously holding down full-time jobs 
with the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Vientiane. 
Stuart-Fox, who had a science degree, was working on crop-substitution projects, 
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while Page, then only 19 years old, was a lowly gardener, "tending flowers at the 
U. S. compound." Page remembered being paid very poorly by the wire service --
only 10 cents per word, or 10 dollars per photograph -- and being severely limited 
in the number of column inches he was allowed to submit for publication (Page, 
interview with author, February 2001 ). Estelle Holt, a British freelancer who 
wrote for various London-based dailies, the AP, and Reuters, was said to have 
been so down in the mouth that she couldn't afford a proper rental, and took turns 
sleeping over at friends' houses.3 
Romance, Derision, Secrecy 
Few journalists saw Laos as intrinsically important in itself. Indeed, most 
who covered Laos considered it mainly a nuisance, a way station, and a stepping 
stone to bigger things and a byline out of Vietnam. In most journalistic accounts 
written after the Indochina wars, Laos merits only a brief mention, if that. Of the 
few memoirs that go into any detail , most openly admit the disdain in which the 
reporters held Laos. The recollections of Malcolm Browne, who covered Vietnam 
and Laos for the Associated Press and later on, the New York Times, are typical: 
No American correspondents ever visited the Ho Chi Minh Trail or other 
Laotian territory that mattered to the real war, so they covered the 
shenanigans of the Laotian princes, politicians, and generals. By hawking 
inflated stories about endless Laotian crises, the Western press created a 
Laos that never was. The newsmen had fun, but it was not journalism's 
finest hour (Browne, Muddy Boots and Red Socks, 149). 
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William Prochnau ' s Once Upon a Distant War also conveys an authentic 
flavor of the fly-by-night journalistic environment in Laos, but his work is more 
concerned with the lives of the reporters in Saigon; Laos is covered in a handful of 
pages. What is clear from the extant literature, as well as from several interviews 
conducted by this author with journalists who reported from Laos, is that no one 
cared very much about what was happening there -- at least not until the late 
1960s, when the domestic consensus in the United States had turned against the 
war. 
Even at that late date, there appears to have been a palpable 
"romanticization" of the conflict. H. D. S. "David" Greenway, now of the Boston 
Globe, was one of many reporters who fell under the spell of Laos. Remembering 
his first visit to Vientiane in 1967, the then-correspondent for Time/Life recalls 
having been "absolutely enchanted." It was December, and "all of Vientiane was 
wrapped in smoke," he said, this being the cold season when the Laotians build 
outdoor fires with abandon to keep warm. Greenway's own father had been a 
naturalist and something of a celebrity in Laos, and to this day, the son says, he 
keeps the father's "Order of the Elephant" medal, awarded by the last king of 
Laos, in his office at the Globe. 
When Greenway speaks of the secrecy in which the war was slu·ouded, he 
reveals an almost nostalgic feeling for those times, and a fairly protective attitude 
toward the most famous "proconsul" of the war, Ambassador William Sullivan. 
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"I had a good relationship with Sullivan," Greenway remembers of the man who 
personally directed the air campaign from the comfort of his own office during the 
period 1964-1969. "I thought he was as frank as he could be. You never knew 
the truth in Laos anyway." 
The embassy "didn't try to prevent me from reporting," Greenway 
remembered. But it did in effect hinder the reporting, he acknowledged, by 
"preventing access to up-country." The CIA-run war was taking place on the 
Plain of Jars in northeastern Laos, not in downtown Vientiane. In southeastern 
Laos, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was strictly off-limits. Getting to either battle zone 
would have required transportation, something singularly unavailable to the 
reporters. 
As Jerome Doolittle, press attache at the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane from 
1968 to 1970, recalled to this researcher: 
We controlled most means of communication, and we limited access 
except for dog-and-pony shows, usually to San1 Thong [a USAID rice-
distribution center for refugees]. What ground combat there was (and the 
actual level, by Vietnam standards anyway) occurred out of sight. So did 
the entire air war. You were not even aware of it overhead, the missions 
were directed around Laos (Doolittle, letter to author, 29 November 2000). 
Given the embassy ' s penchant for "no comment," the reporters had to 
scrape up other sources: loose-lipped pilots for Air America, the clandestine 
airline of the CIA; the Deuxieme Bureau (intelligence) folks in the French 
Embassy; and Soviet or Polish diplomats. Tim Page recalls weekly all-night 
chess-and-drinking games in which some or all of the above regularly 
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participated, along with whatever reporters were on hand. Another place to find 
sources was at the Constellation Hotel on Samsenthai Street, just around the 
corner from the American Embassy. 
Reporters, diplomats, and other foreign visitors to Laos during the 1960s 
congregated and swapped stories at the Constellation, which was run by an 
ebullient half-French, half-Chinese named Auguste "Maurice" Cavalerie. One of 
the reporters, Martin Stuart-Fox, even wound up marrying Maurice's daughter. It 
was at the run-down Constellation that one November night in 1963, UPI's Ray 
Herndon gave Stuart-Fox a quickie journalism lesson. That was the night before 
Herndon took off to cover the assassination of President Ngo Diem in Saigon. 
Herndon thought he would be back in a week or two, but UPI assigned him full-
time to Vietnam, and left Stuart-Fox, who had never worked as a reporter in his 
life, to be the resident "unipresser" in Vientiane (recollections of Herndon, Stuart-
Fox, and Tim Page to author, February 2001). 
Living It Up in Vientiane 
The Constellation was to Vientiane as the Hotel Caravelle was to Saigon; 
for decades after the war its name would be wrapped up in the mythology of the 
correspondents. Malcolm Browne remembered the hotel bar thus: 
. .. during the rainy season, [it was] filled with stray dogs and mud tracked 
in from the unpaved street. Cables to correspondents from their home 
offices were placed in the slots of a rack the . . . hotel owner hung up in 
the bar, and ever eager to steal a march on competitors, correspondents 
constantly opened and read each other's messages (Browne, 150). 
Indeed, the numerousfarangs (the Lao word for the French, or later, any 
foreigner) hanging about the Constellation revealed a central fact: most of the 
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reporters, the Americans anyway, did not speak Lao. In fact, few spoke French, 
either. This liability led to a situation in which the repmiers avoided almost 
entirely the views of the persons most affected by the war, the Lao themselves. 
Compounding the cultural gap was the lack of infrastructure, especially reliable 
methods for communicating with the outside world. As one reporter put it, "the 
phones were beyond primitive -- you could use the PTT [Poste, Transport, and 
Telecommunications] office and that was about it."4 
Transportation was -- and still is -- notoriously difficult in Laos. The 
French-built "highway" system by then already was falling into disrepair. It 
consisted of only a few paved roads: Route 13 from Vientiane north to the royal 
capital of Luang Prabang; Route 9 from Savaimakhet east to Vinh in central 
Vietnam; and Routes 6 and 7 from the Plain of Jars north and east into northern 
Vietnam. The Americans later built a road from Kasi on Route 13 east to the 
secret CIA base at Long Tieng, but no outsiders were allowed on it. 
Moreover, it was dangerous out there. With no press guidance to issue, 
the U. S. Embassy also had no reason to facilitate the work ofreporters. Unlike in 
Vietnam, there was no centralized accreditation system for journalists and no 
systematic means of transport. 5 A reporter striking out on his own upcountry 
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would likely lose his way, run into combatants on either side, or otherwise get into 
trouble. 
With nowhere to go and no way to get there, all but the most enterprising 
reporters were confined to downtown Vientiane with its gold shops, whorehouses, 
and opium dens. At the same time, remembers Richard Pyle of the Associated 
Press, Laos was "a reporter's dream, with its beguiling aura of mystery and 
danger, sensuous charm, exotic characters and colorful oddities .... It was a 
'Casablanca' movie set come to life" (Pyle letter to author, 2 February 200 I). 
Some journalists reportedly carried Lao government-issued "opium 
addict" identification cards, which provided easy access to the dens and 
guaranteed no trouble from the authorities. Several sources interviewed for this 
research indicated that various reporters were more interested in personally 
experiencing the local color, in the way of frequenting prostitutes and smoking 
opium, than in getting at the story of what the U. S. Government was up to in 
Laos. 
Fred Branfman, an antiwar activist who reported for Dispatch News 
Service from Laos in the late 1960s, said that the mainstream American reporters 
who came through Vientiane "didn't care about what was happening in Laos, and 
were just serving their time hanging out at the local bars," such as the White Rose 
and Madame Lulu's. And they weren't just buying beer there, either (Branfman 
interview with author, 11 March 2001 ). Indeed, former journalist Zalin Grant 
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recalls cynically: "I think most reporters looked on their time in Laos almost as R 
& R [ rest and relaxation] ." Grant went on to say that the main "legacy" of the 
American reporters lay not in their coverage of Laos, but in their bringing back to 
the United States the phenomenon of Lao "lap dancing" (Grant, letters to author, 2 
April and 7 April 2001). 
Taking the Government 's Side 
Indeed, it appears that hearing the full story of American engagement was 
not something to be pursued too assiduously, at least not in the early years. "We 
were officially supporting neutrality," Boston Globe editor David Greenway says, 
appearing to acknowledge a link between U. S. Government policy and the stance 
of the press. "I can see some sense to the idea of not admitting" the extent of the 
U. S. role in the war "and not talking about it. . .. Neither side [the U.S. on the 
one hand or the Soviets/Chinese on the other ] wanted Laos to become another 
Vietnam" (Greenway interview with author, May 2000). 
One former reporter who boldly defends the position of the U. S. 
Government vis-a-vis the "secrecy" question is Arthur Dommen, who covered 
Vietnam and Laos for both UPI and the Los Angeles Times. UPI posted Dommen 
to Saigon in 1959; his first visit to Laos was in connection with the Kong Le coup, 
in August 1960. He returned many times thereafter and later wrote an important 
book about the Laos theater. "We [the press corps] had good friends in the 
embassy," Oommen recalled. "We understood the reason for the secrecy. The 
embassy was trying to preserve the fiction that they weren't there." 
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From Oommen's point of view, "The North Vietnamese were determined 
to control eastern Laos, and the Lao were trying to defend their country from 
communism." Oommen asserts that the Royal Lao Government had a right to ask 
for U. S. assistance, and the U. S. not only responded correctly but was "fully 
justified" in defending Souvanna Phouma's regime. Moreover, he said, 
Ambassador Sullivan was co1Tect in his "determination to keep the secrecy." 
Oommen described Fred Branfman, the former volunteer humanitarian 
worker who in late 1969 was instrumental in helping "break" the story of U.S. 
covert involvement, as a "propagandist trying to make out that the U. S. was 
responsible." Oommen makes a clear distinction between the early reporters in 
Laos like himself, and the more critical ones like Branfman who arrived later on, 
whom he is convinced "were looking for a story to implicate the Americans" 
(author interview with Oommen, July 2000). 
Attitudes of the U. S. Mission 
Just how far Ambassador Sullivan was willing to go in keeping the secret 
became clear to Oommen and the others only later. If the attitudes of some 
reporters reveal a passive acceptance of the U.S. Government "line," the 
recollections of American personnel associated with the war effort in Laos 
demonstrate that the U. S. mission in general and its ambassadors in particular 
regarded the reporters as naive nuisances and as forces to be neutralized. 
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George Dalley, a USAID contractor who worked in Borakon village in 
southeastern Laos from l 963 through 1965, recalls Ambassador Sullivan's having 
specifically told him not to talk to the press. Dalley said that Sullivan made a trip 
to see him at his post near Paxane, in late 1964 or early 1965, and "advised me 
against talking to the media." Dalley also alleged that self-deception was a 
regular practice at the embassy. During Dalley's exit interview in 1967 with the 
then-AID director, Charles Mann, Dalley says he was told disingenuously, "You 
can rest assured that Air America is not a CIA airline," as though the fact of the 
CIA link was not already common knowledge to all but the most ignorant 
observer6 (Dalley interview with author, July 2000). 
Bill Sage, who spent a collective seven years in Laos working for 
International Voluntary Services (IVS) and USAID, likewise recalled to this 
writer "the pervasiveness of the American effort" to keep secret the details of 
U. S. involvement. He acknowledged "official restrictions" regarding talking to 
the press, although there was "nothing in writing." In the main, he said, 
journalists were to be "handled by USIS" (United States Information Service, the 
public affairs arm of the embassy; Sage interview with author, November 2000). 
Vint Lawrence, a CIA adviser to the Hmong army in the early 1960s, had 
no run-ins with the press because he was based up-country and was forbidden to 
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come into Vientiane lest he blow his cover. But he recalled that in the view of the 
U. S. mission, "The press was viewed as being generally just a tad above the PL 
[Pathet Lao]" (Lawrence letter to author, March 2001 ). And Win McKeithen, an 
AID employee who was based on the Plain of Jars, scene of much of the fighting, 
remembered 
the time in Sam Thong when our secretary got a call on the radio from 
Vientiane that a couple of reporters were flying up for a visit in the midst 
of a refugee crisis, and asked us what to do with them. "Fuck ' em," was 
our instinctive response, to which she replied, "But it' s not in my job 
description" (McKeithen letter to author, 2 February 200 I). 7 
Similarly, AID officer Ernie Kuhn reveals in an oral history conducted 
many years after the fact that providing any assistance to the press corps was the 
last thing on his mind. Following is an excerpt of his exchange with interviewer 
Arthur Oommen: 
Kuhn: 'I was instructed by Pop [Edgar Buell, the director of the AID 
refugee program] . .. and this is how relatively secret the program was 
supposed to be ... that there were only four people whom I was ever to 
talk to about refugees or military operations.' 
Interviewer (Oommen): 'These did not include journalists, I presume.' 
Kuhn: 'These did not include journalists, no. One was Joe Mendenhall, 
the [ AID] director; another was, of course, Ambassador Sullivan; one was 
Alex Mavro, who was AID executive office; and the fourth person was 
whoever the [CIA] station chief was in the embassy. Everything we did 
upcountry was to be considered classified' (Kuhn memoirs, 7). 
How such dissembling might have impacted serious journalism is not 
difficult to imagine. Martin Stuart-Fox, the Australian aid worker-turned reporter-
turned historian, recalled: 
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We knew the bombing was going on. I went to interview the U.S. 
Ambassador [Sullivan] off the record, and asked what was going on. He 
said nothing, and we just looked at each other. I knew he was lying, and 
he knew I knew he was lying. I said: "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador." In 
that case there [didn't] seem to be anything else to say (Stuart-Fox letter to 
author, 22 December 2000). 
Stuart-Fox tells another widely circulated anecdote of the period, which he 
acknowledges may be apocryphal, involving Sullivan's successor, U. S. 
Ambassador G. McMurtrie "Mac" Godley, at a diplomatic function. The story is 
emblematic of the surrealistic and cynical nature of the deception being practiced 
by the embassy in the late 1960s. When U. S. aircraft overflew the reception, 
Stuart-Fox writes, "the Soviet ambassador asked genially if those were American 
planes. The U.S. Ambassador looked up, shaded his eyes, and said: 'Planes, 
Boris? I don't see any planes"' (Stuart- Fox letter, 22 December 2000). In sum, 
if the recollections of these participant-observers are to be believed, the embassy 
and its personnel, from the ambassador on down, were not above denying the truth 
to themselves, their diplomatic counterparts, their own staffs, or the journalists. 
Getting at the Impenetrable "Secret" 
It appears nevertheless that Ambassador Godley's well-known penchant 
for bluster sometimes overcame his ability to keep silent about his own role in the 
air war. Joe Galloway, a former UPI reporter in Sa_igon, recalls Godley as "a hell 
of a hard-liner who boasted to us [ a group of reporters whom the ambassador had 
invited to dinner] that he personally approved all the airs trikes inside the Lao 
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borders" (Galloway letter to author, 2 February 2001). And Leon Daniel, a UPI 
reporter who covered Vietnam and Laos for about six years out of Saigon, Tokyo, 
and Bangkok, said that "all the correspondents knew Ambassador Godley was 
running the war" (Godley having replaced Sullivan in the summer of 1969). 
Daniel described a map of Laos showing possible bombing targets that hung on 
Godley's office wall in the U. S. Embassy. "A Lao colonel would call in a B-52 
strike," Daniel said. "Godley would OK the [bombing] target or turn it down" 
(Daniel interview with author, May 2000). Despite the blatant truth before them, 
Daniel said, the reporters could unearth few details. 
"The secret war was no secret" to the U. S. press corps, he told this author. 
"We wanted to know more and we wanted to write about it. But we couldn't get 
enough info [sic] to write about it." Daniel said that a few junior Foreign Service 
Officers in the embassy "would talk some"; otherwise, an enterprising journalist 
had to "eyeball things for himself." 
Jerome Doolittle, Godley's press attache from 1968-1970, is even more 
categorical about the extent of the deception: 
When I first arrived in Laos, I was instructed to answer all press questions 
about our massive and merciless bombing campaign in that tiny country 
with: "At the request of the Royal Laotian Government, the United States 
is conducting unarmed reconnaissance flights accompanied by armed 
escorts who have the right to return fire if fired upon" .... This was a lie. 
Every reporter to whom I told it knew it was a lie. The Communist Pathet 
Lao knew it was a lie. Hanoi knew it was a lie. The International Control 
Commission knew it was a lie. Every interested Congressman and 
newspaper reader knew it was a lie. . .. All the lie did was make us look 
just as cheap and dishonest as the North Vietnamese, who were also lying 
about the presence of their troops in Laos and South Vietnam (Doolittle 
op-ed piece, The New York Times, 20 September 1973). 
90 
So di sgusted did Doolittle become with the policy in Laos that he resigned 
from government and went on to write a scathing commentary about the conduct 
of the war, in the form of a novel called The Bombing Officer. Even Arthur 
Oommen, the former reporter who went on to become one of the foremost experts 
on Laos, admitted with a sigh, "how little we [the reporters] knew of what was 
going on. "8 
Preferential Access 
Notwithstanding the arguments outlined above, it also ironically appears 
that some journalists were given preferential access to sensitive military and 
intelligence sites and secrets. In his memoirs, AID employee Ernie Kuhn 
mentions the popular magazine National Geographic and one of its regular 
photojournalists, William Garrett, as being exempt from the usual "treatment": 
We had very specific orders [from the U.S. Embassy] that National 
Geographic is very sympathetic to us, they are not going to write anything 
that is going to be harmful to the program, take them around and give 
them what they want to see (Kuhn, 75). 
As for Bill Garrett, Kuhn recalls, he "had free rein to go any place he 
wanted to" (Kuhn, 73). That Garrett and National Geographic received such a 
friendly reception from the AID workers did not mean that anything remotely 
controversial got into print. 
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A review of the relevant National Geographic articles from the mid- l 950s 
right up through 197 4 reveals an almost reverential tone toward American 
involvement, as the venerable magazine's writers praised AID's fight against 
communism and rarely mentioned the more controversial aspects of the U.S. 
program, including covert guerrilla activity and bombings. One article for which 
Garrett took the photographs, but which was written by Peter White, described 
Lao ethnic minority refugees fleeing "from Pathet Lao, from North Vietnamese, 
from bombings by Royal Lao planes." (This article appeared in December 1968, 
after French newspapers already had begun to report the saturation bombing of 
northern Laos by U.S. B-52 bombers.) 
A piece written six years later, for which Garrett wrote the text and took 
the pictures, refers to AID refugee relief director Pop Buell as "my old friend." 
While applauding AID's role in providing food, medical care and shelter to 
Hmong refugees over more than a decade, the magazine still avoids 
acknowledging the U. S. bombing campaign that was at least partly responsible 
for the refugee flows . 
Other reporters are not so charitable regarding the U. S. Embassy' s 
stonewalling of the press in Laos, or with the reporters' passivity thereto. Arnold 
"Skip" Isaacs, a former Baltimore Sun correspondent in Hong Kong, is one of 
them. Isaacs ' assessment is that the U. S. Government made fools of the 
American reporters, and the reporters acquiesced. Isaacs recalls almost bitterly 
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that "it was very difficult to get any detail" about American involvement. 
Perversely, he said, the situation was compounded by the clouded judgment of 
some newspeople who were too close to U.S. Government sources. This was 
particularly true with respect to the intelligence services. "There was no 
relationship between the [Central Intelligence] Agency and the press like there 
was in Indochina," Isaacs told this author in a January 2000 interview. The 
internecine rivalry between the intelligence operatives and the military brass 
created a situation in which the former sometimes wooed the press to the 
disadvantage of the latter. "The CIA out in the field were the most transparent 
spooks in the history of spookdom," Isaacs said. He recalled some reporters 
relishing having an "inside track" with the CIA, and he alleged that some of them 
were "so very cozy" with intelligence operatives that their behavior raised a 
question of "ethical malfeasance." 
Fred Branfman, the volunteer-turned journalist-activist, alleged that some 
reporters were so close to their government sources that they might as well have 
been "spies" for the U.S. Embassy. This was particularly true of reporters who 
did not live in Vientiane but only parachuted in on an irregular basis, he said. He 
described the coverage by stateside-based reporters as almost uniformly 
"compliant" with the Washington line (Branfman interview with author, March 
2001 ). However, Tim Page, the UPI stringer who played poker with the 
intelligence agents in the early 1960s, puts a different spin on it: "Who was using 
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whom? The CIA war wasn't fully revealed, but we [the reporters] knew who the 
spooks were. It was that obvious, that silly. It was the stuff of The Honorable 
Schoolboy [the John leCarre espionage novel]" (Page interview with author, 
February 200 I). 
One reporter who seemed to have unusual access to what was going on in 
Laos was the late Robert Shaplen of The New Yorker. During his two decades as 
a Southeast Asia correspondent for that magazine, Shaplen filed more than 50 
pieces, including several from Laos. Roger Warner has written that Shaplen was 
given "unusual access to the Laos war theater, on the understanding that he would 
not directly write about his sources in the CIA" (Shooting at the Moon, 244). 
Shaplen's sources apparently included not only the Vientiane CIA station but also 
Edward Lansdale, the CIA operative who masterminded the early American "civil 
action" operations in Vietnam. According to author Zalin Grant, Lansdale and 
Shaplen were great buddies, dating from their acquaintance in the Philippines in 
the 1950s (Grant, Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the 
United States in Vietnam, 199 l ). Other sources interviewed in the course of this 
research, including Jerome Doolittle, the former press attache at the American 
Embassy, alleged that Shaplen knew a lot more about CIA activity in Laos than 
his erudite reports of the time revealed.9 
ldeo/0 d gy an News Management 
As indicated with respect to National Geographic, any study of 
Journalistic coverage of the war in Indochina must take into account the 
conserv t· . . . . a JVe culture prevailmg at the stateside headquarters of the mam media of 
the era I 1 · n t 1e 1960s, a time before CNN's round-the-clock news service and the 
Internet l , popu ar lowbrow press such as Life, Time, Look, Newsweek, Reader 's 
Digest, and the Saturday Evening Post were as influential as any other medium in 
bringfu v· . . g 1etnam--and Laos, what httle coverage there was -- to the Amencan 
PUblic. And most of these influences were decidedly conservative ones. For 
example, the very right-wing publisher of Time and Life, Henry Luce, regularly 
attempted to reign in and censor his reporters. Most famously, in the 20 
September 1963 issue of Time, Luce ran an editorial questioning the loyalty, 
judgment, and reliability of his Saigon press corps -- an incident over which 
Charles Mohr, one of Time 's best reporters, resigned. Similarly, Newsweek failed 
to Protect its best-known correspondent in Saigon, the Frenchman Francois Sully. 
When the intrepid reporter ran afoul of the ruling Diem family; he was expelled. 10 
Even at the esteemed "Gray Lady," the New York Times, the ideology of 
the news "gatekeepers" was solidly pro-establishment, particularly during the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The long-time managing editor was 
Clifton Daniel, son-in-law of former President Harry S. Truman. Foreign editor 
James Greenfield had been an assistant secretary of state for public affairs. 
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Presumably, these key personalities may account in part for the predisposition of 
the Times to accept at face value the official "facts" handed to them by 
Washington elites over the judgment of their own reporters, including the brilliant 
but difficult David Halberstam. 
Paradoxically, although the news managers and the U.S. Government 
theoretically had different agendas vis-a-vis American involvement in Indochina, 
in reality their views of the global nature of communism were quite similar. It is 
possible to identify in the written record a mainstream ideology shared by 
journalists and bureaucrats alike. Thus, mid-l 960s accounts from Time, National 
Geographic, or the columns of Joe Alsop in the Washington Post are remarkably 
similar to recollections of some of the participant observers. An example by 
Charles Weldon, a physician and the director of public health for USAID-Laos for 
nearly a decade, will serve to illustrate: 
Laos was a lovely, innocent country of delightful people invaded by a 
vicious, powerful, cruel Communist enemy. There was no doubt in our 
minds [the U. S. Government personnel] that Communism was a deadly 
threat to the free world and that our mission was good and righteous. We 
were the same guys who hit the beach at Omaha, Anzio, and lwo Jima in 
WW [World War] II . The good guys. (Weldon letter to author, 23 January 
2001). 
Or consider the famous Saturday Evening Post story on Edgar "Pop" 
Buell, Weldon's colleague in USAID, which was later turned into a popular, albeit 
misleading, book. The headline of that aiiicle makes clear that the story will be 
told from a particulai· point of view: "An American Hero: The exclusive story of 
how an American farmer has devoted his life to a one-man crusade for freedom 
and democracy in war-torn, Communist-infiltrated Laos" (Don Schanche, 
Saturday Evening Post, 2 June 1962). Following the publication of this article 
and the companion book, Mr. Pop, Buell became one of the few American 
personages in Laos with whom the U. S. public was familiar. But these 
publications offered no clue about expanding covert American paramilitary 
activity in Laos. 
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The hagiography of Buell in the American popular press in the 1960s was 
comparable to the personality cult manufactured in the 1950s by Life, Look, and 
the Reader 's Digest surrounding another charismatic figure, the dashing physician 
Tom Dooley. Dooley, a staunch anti-Communist, had come to public attention 
during 1954, when he was involved in ministering to Catholic refugees fleeing 
North Vietnam following the Geneva agreements. For the rest of the decade, the 
popular press often featured stories about Tom Dooley and his medical clinics in 
remote areas of Laos. What they did not feature was in-depth analysis of the 
various sociopolitical difficulties besetting the tiny Asian nation or the role of the 
American government therein. Nor did they offer any perspective on how "the 
Reds," "the enemy," or anyone other than the Americans may have felt about what 
was happening in Laos. 
Even New York Times (NY1) articles from the I 950s and early 1960s 
essentially repeated the standard U.S. Government line regarding the need to fight 
97 
communism. The articles also took at face value U. S. denials of covert or other 
involvement in Lao internal politics. Thus a NYT article of 12 May 1957 was 
entitled "Success of U. S. Aid Projects in Laos," at the very time that this aid was 
being used to fuel elite c01Tuption in Vientiane. A year later, in a 14 May 1958 
story, the NYT began to report on waste and malpractice in the U. S. aid program 
because, by then, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) had begun to 
investigate the corruption. 
In 1960, we find the NYT reporting in an August 10 story that Americans 
plan to train Lao troops, but that the U. S. role is "limited to nontactical 
activities ." Ironically, this was the moment when the CIA was considering plans 
to recruit Hmong mercenaries for its proxy war. In another story the same month, 
the NYT does not question the U. S. Government denial that it is "setting up bases 
or sending troops" to Laos. Again, even as this report was going to press, the CIA 
was launching the chain of events leading to the setting up of the secret base at 
Long Tieng, from which the Hmong army would operate for the next 15 years. 
With respect to the other side of the war--the view from the Pathet Lao or 
North Vietnamese vantage points--journalistic coverage in the American press 
was negligible. (Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times was the first 
American journalist to visit Hanoi, and that was at the very late date of 1966.) 
Some journalists told this author that they tried to report alternative views but 
were unsuccessful, and now suspect their stories may have been spiked by their 
stateside editors. For example, Martin Stuart-Fox, who covered Laos for UPI, 
remembered that "when regular bombing of Laos began in 1965, the Pathet Lao 
radio reported each attack, the number of planes, direction, altitude, bombs 
dropped, etc. We [the reporters]) knew what was going on." And for his part, 
Stuart-Fox said, he tried his best to report it. He said that in his drafts he quoted 
Pathet Lao radio reporting the American bombing, but that "nothing would 
appear" about it in his published stories in the United States. "I suspect that 
stories were checked, denied by U. S. authorities, and spiked as communist 
propaganda, but I have no proof!" (Stuart-Fox letters to author, 23 January 2001 
and 22 February 2001 ). 
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Similarly, Tim Page said that in the summer of 1964, sources in the Pathet 
Lao mission in Vientiane told him they were shooting down U. S. planes; when he 
went to the U. S. Embassy to check out the story, he said, "The Americans denied 
the whole bloody thing." Indeed, from that point on, a "disinformation campaign" 
from Washington to Vientiane was firmly in place, he said (Page, interview with 
author, March 2001). 
Or, to put it quite another way: 
The American news media were ... always ready to depict the Laotian 
troubles in terms of the global struggle with communism . . . . The first 
headlines attracted journalists to the scene of the purported action. Once 
there, they needed something to report. This the Laotians provided by 
relaying sketchy radio messages from remote areas and by stating rumors 
as irrefutable facts. Any hint of North Vietnamese participation was 
particularly welcomed since it fit the popular conception of 'aggression,' 
which is always a bigger story than a mere civil war (Stevenson, 76). 
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The Story Comes Out 
As we have seen, during the tenure of Ambassador William Sullivan 
( 1964-1969) there was no question that the press would not cover the operational 
details of American involvement in Laos. In an interview with Christopher 
Robbins, author of The Ravens, Sullivan recalled: 
I did not consider the press to be a problem. They were always pleading to 
be allowed to go up to Long Tieng [the CIA base on the Plain of Jars] and 
all these exotic places where they knew things to be going on, but of 
course we would jolly them along and not let them go (Robbins, 23 7). 
But by the late 1960s it was no longer feasible for the American war-
managers, including the new ambassador, Mac Godley, to count on cooperation 
from the journalists. Something had happened in Vietnam that would henceforth 
ensure bad press for the American war in Laos: the Tet Offensive of early 1968. 
Now, in parallel with the American public, journalists were turning against the 
Indochina war. It was clear the American side was not winning, and could not 
win. Already, American casualties had reached several tens of thousands in 
Vietnam alone. Anti-war feeling in the United States was at a fever pitch. 
Then, in March I 970, President Nixon made the fateful decision to invade 
Cambodia, a move which according to one analyst 
seemed to galvanize at one sudden and certainly unexpected moment. .. 
all the opposition to the war which had been crystallizing among the 
nation's youth and even among their elders, most of whom had now 
ceased to believe either in our capacity or in our real need to win in 
Vietnam (Paul Kattenburg, The American Trauma in American Foreign 
Policy, 1945-1975, 1982: 145). 
Simultaneously, with respect to Laos, President Nixon committed an 
equally major gaffe. On March 6 the president released a statement 
acknowledging that, while the U.S. Government had been involved in Laos for 
years, there had been "no American combat deaths" there. Struck with this 
assertion, the American press went for the story. 
Meanwhile, a 25-year-old former Peace Corps Volunteer named T. D. 
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Allman had moved to Laos and was stringing for the Bangkok Post, which was 
publishing articles that had not yet appeared in any American paper. His 
housemate was Fred Branfman, a former volunteer with International Voluntary 
Services (IVS). Following his stint with IVS, Branfman hooked up with Dispatch 
News Service, the alternative press that had broken, among other important 
stories, the My Lai massacre incident. Having lived in Laos and learned to speak 
Lao, Branfman made up his mind to get out the story of the secret war, 
pai1icularly the bombing campaign' s effect on civilians. Allman would be his key 
ally in this crusade. 
As explained in the previous chapter, by the summer of 1969, fighting and 
bombing on the Plain of Jars had reached frightful intensity. The CIA airlifted 
25,000 refugees from the Plain of Jars to remove them from the scene of the 
bombing. These refugees were resettled just north of Vientiane, on the road to the 
royal capital of Luang Prabang. There, for the first time since the bombing had 
begun, its victims were within reach of the journalists. Branfman interviewed the 
IOI 
refugees, then introduced them to Allman and other American reporters who were 
now congregating, belatedly, in Laos. "From their perspective I was giving them 
story ideas," Branfman remembered. "From my perspective, I was getting out the 
story of the bombings." Similarly, Branfman provided Lao sources for Henry 
Kamm, the first full-time New York Times reporter assigned to Laos--at the late 
date of September 1969. Branfman then assisted Ted Koppel, Sidney Schanberg, 
and Bernard Kalb in their endeavors to investigate the extent of U.S. bombing in 
Cambodia. Likewise, he also began to supply information to key contacts in the 
U.S. Congress (Branfman interview with author, March 2001). 11 
Thus by early 1970, the U.S. bombing of northern Laos was on the front 
pages of American newspapers. That February the U.S. Embassy laid on a 
special flight to take reporters up to Sam Thong, the USAID distribution center 
for refugees. Branfman and Allman were on board. When the airplane was about 
to leave Sam Thong, it was discovered that Allman, along with L(fe 's Saigon-
based bureau chief John Saar and AFP's Max Coffait, had escaped from their 
USAID handlers and walked over the mountain to the CIA secret base at Long 
Tieng. Afterwards, Allman and the others filed stories containing the first 
eyewitness details of activities at the base, which had been operating at full 
throttle for nearly a decade. 
Meanwhile, due in part to efforts by Branfman, U. S. Senator Stuart 
Symington had conducted hearings on Laos on Capitol Hill in October 1969. Had 
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any representatives from the press been allowed to attend, they would have heard 
some eye-opening testimony, particularly from former ambassador William 
Sullivan (by then having taken up a new position as U. S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian Affairs). Indeed, Senator William Fulbright inflicted a 
merciless inquisition on Sullivan regarding the extent of U.S . involvement in 
Laos. However, the hearings were classified, and a heavily redacted version of 
the minutes were released to the public only after another year had elapsed. 12 
Indeed, according to Jerry Doolittle, official denial of the bombings of 
Cambodia and Laos continued well past their exposure in the press. "Insofar as 
the executive branch could possibly manage it, the air war in Indochina was kept a 
secret till August 15 [ 1973 ], the day Congress ended it (Doolittle, "The Search 
for Peace of Mind, Through Lies," New York Times, 1973). 
The air campaign also is curiously absent, or near-absent, from various 
accounts of the war written years later. Perry Stieglitz, an American cultural 
affairs officer posted to the embassy for many years and the husband of the 
daughter of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, never mentions it in his In a Little 
Kingdom (1990). Nor does Ambassador Sullivan, in his curiously detached 
memoir, Obligatto (1984). Charles Weldon, USAID's long-time medical director 
in Laos, does capture vividly the atmosphere of war, and tells us that" ... from 
1963 to 1973, the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao displaced approximately one 
million people from their homes at least once" (Tragedy in Paradise, 51 ). 
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However, nowhere does Weldon acknowledge that the internally displaced Lao 
may have been fleeing American bombs as much as they were fleeing Communist 
111vas10n. 
In retrospect 
To sum up: From the summer of 1962, when the series of fluff pieces 
about Pop Buell appeared and the second Geneva Conference supposedly returned 
"neutrality" to Laos, to approximately mid-1969, Laos appears simply to have 
disappeared off the U.S. press radar screen. As Stars and Stripes reporter Steve 
Stibbens recalled, "After 1963 we seldom heard the word 'Laos.'" (Stibbens' 
letter to author, February 2001 ). Journalistic inattention to Laos was particularly 
marked after August 7, 1964, the date the U. S. Congress passed the Gulf of 
Tonkin resolution, clearing the way for President Lyndon Johnson to turn the 
Vietnam conflict into one involving American combat troops. Thereafter, the 
U. S. press corps just couldn' t be bothered with what was happening in Laos. 
American boys were fighting and dying in Vietnam, and this was the story about 
which the American public and American editors were demanding the details. No 
wonder, then, as the latter-day journalist Roger Warner has written, "The kingdom 
[ of Laos] was allowed to slip again into its customary obscurity, a place where the 
few men on the scene were allowed to call the shots more or less as they saw fit" 
(Warner, Shooting at the Moon, 137). 
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It was therefore a French journalist, not an American, who became the first 
reporter to expose the extent of U. S. bombing in northern Laos. This was 
Jacques Decornoy of Le Monde, who had requested and received permission from 
the Pathet Lao to visit the "liberated" areas of northeastern Laos. His reports 
began appearing in the European press in July 1968, more than a year before the 
U. S. public would begin to read about the bombing. As we have seen, the first 
American account showing something of the extent of the bombings did not 
appear until late 1969, initially in the reports of freelancer T. D. Allman, whose 
articles mainly were appearing overseas. Allman' s October l article in the New 
York Times was the first indication by that paper of the extent of the devastation. 
U. S. bombers, Allman reported, are "able to destroy, almost at will, any given 
town, bridge, road or concentration of enemy soldiers or civilians." This was 
followed by an October 11 piece by Henry Kamm based on refugee accounts, 
detailing the destruction of the town of Phonsevan. By this time, the bombing of 
the Pathet Lao stronghold Sam Neua had been going on for three years without the 
New York Times , the American newspaper ofrecord, mentioning it. 13 
Karen Olness, an American medical doctor who worked with USAID in 
Laos from 1962-1964 and again from 1966-1968, believes that some U. S. 
journalists may have been legitimately unaware of the extent of the bombing. 
According to Olness, many U. S. mission personnel, including herself, were not 
"in the know." Only a small handful of persons inside Ambassador Sullivan's 
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inner circle would have had access to the operational details of the air campaign. 
(Olness interview with author, 19 February 200 I). That the journalists could 
have been that naive seems rather unlikely to me, even though, as we have already 
seen, Sullivan was skilled at keeping the news from just about everyone: 
While occasional articles in the American press alluded to the secret war 
in Laos, it was relatively easy for the American Embassy to maintain an 
official curtain of silence over the clandestine activities. Ambassador 
Sullivan asked the small handful of Western correspondents in Vientiane 
to observe discretion in their reporting on the grounds of Soviet sensitivity 
to publicity given American activities (Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 305). 
That the journalists simply acceded to Sullivan's request is the more likely 
explanation for the long delay in reporting the air campaign. Why they would 
have done so is disturbing in retrospect, but perfectly understandable given what 
we know about the ideological mood of the U.S . Government and public during 
those critical Cold War years . 
The example of Laos clearly outlines a central feature of American 
journalism in the 1960s. It was a transition period for journalism, as older 
repo1iers who had spent their formative years covering World War II and Korea 
showed up in Vietnam (and occasionally, Laos) for one last adventure reporting 
combat. Meanwhile, a new set of younger, brasher reporters arrived on the scene. 
Some had journalism training; others had none. But the Vietnam War gave them 
the chance they needed, the chance for a byline. Some of them would turn into 
skeptics of the government by the late l 960s. But most, even those who are now 
regarded as "renegades" --the Sheehans, Halberstams, and Arnetts--began their 
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experiences in Vietnam prepared to see the United States win the war. Their 
points of reference, by their own admission, were patriotic, pro-American ones. 14 
One Reporter's Story: Henry Kamm 
Arguably one of the most famous reportorial reputations to come out of 
the American war in Indochina was that of Henry Kamm, who won the Pulitzer 
Prize for his work on Asian refugees . But Kamm also was instrumental in 
bringing the "secret" war in Laos to the front pages of American papers. The 
story of how did so is instructive. 
Kamm was the first reporter for the New York Times to be assigned to 
cover Laos on a "full -time" basis. In reality, his beat also included Cambodia, and 
technically he lived in Bangkok. He took up his position in the fall of 1969 and 
for the next two years spent a great deal of time in Laos before being assigned to 
cover Southeast Asia as a roving "correspondent." He then returned to Laos in 
June and July 1975 to cover the Communist takeover. (His movements 
correspond with what we know about the drop-off in coverage of Laos between 
1973 , when the American soldiers left Vietnam, and 1975, when the Communists 
besieged Saigon and Phnom Penh, and in a more leisurely, Lao-like fashion--
Vientiane.) 
Kamm recalls that he was put on to his first story in Laos by Fred 
Branfman, the IVS volunteer who had assisted freelancer T. D. Allman. (In fact , 
Kamm took over the Laos beat from Allman, who had been doing occasional 
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stringing for the Times.) Kamm said Branfman introduced him to a group of 
refugees who had fled the bombing in Xieng Khouang Province. The resulting 
story symbolizes the next major reporting coup of the war--the first 
acknowledgement by a full-time correspondent for a mainstream American paper 
that the U. S. Govermnent was bombing an allegedly "neutral" country (Allman's 
initial reports had appeared in the Bangkok Post). 
When asked why the U.S. press was so late in reporting the bombing, 
Kamm attributed it to the fact that previous American reporters had few sources in 
Lao circles, because they could not speak the Lao language. Kamm, on the other 
hand, previously a Jewish refugee from Europe during World War II, spoke fluent 
French, which until the Communist takeover was the official language of 
government in Laos. His language skills allowed him access to personalities and 
officials with whom other reporters had simply never had contact. "Laos was 
covered by people who didn't speak French, so I was like a white elephant," he 
said. "Speaking French helped me create a very different intimacy, and develop a 
certain circle of friends among the Lao." 
Kamm also sees himself as being of a different mindset from other 
American reporters. He refused to accept the "line" coming out of the American 
Embassy, he said. But at the same side, he says, he was not a "Pathet Lao 
sympathizer." Instead, he claims, he didn't believe the "bullshit from either side," 
whether Communist or anti-Communist. He decided to repo1i the war from an 
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entirely different point of view, that of the Lao themselves (Kamm, interview with 
author, February 2001 ). It is important to note, however, that Kamm' s extremely 
important work out of Laos was dependent on the groundwork laid by the 
renegade freelancers Branfman and Allman. 
By then, it was almost too late. U. S. reporters in Laos had missed most of 
the story as it was happening, right under their noses. Of course, that they missed 
the story was not all their fault. As we saw in the previous chapter, both the U. S. 
Government and the U.S. media considered the Laos theater always as an adjunct 
to, a sideshow of, and a distraction from, Vietnam. Once Washington refused to 
acknowledge the full extent of its involvement, it followed that the mainstream 
media likewise never painted the full picture. 
But Laos was an integral part of the bigger picture. Unfortunately, 
Washington did not admit as much to the public, and the press did not portray it as 
such. Or rather, it did not make clear what was happening in Laos, at the time it 
was happening, at the time it was news. 
-
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Notes to Chapter 3 
1 The U. S. Army Center of Military History has a large collection of the 
accreditation files for Saigon correspondents for 1965 to 1973. Initially these files 
were amassed by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACY). William 
Hammond, senior historian for the Center, has performed extensive data analysis 
of the files . The data show that over the span of the war, there were 3811 
reporters accredited in Saigon, of whom 1742 were American citizens. At this 
writing it is impossible to pinpoint with certainty which of the Saigon 
correspondents ever visited or repmied out of Laos, because there was no 
systematic accreditation of journalists by either the Royal Lao Government or the 
U. S. Embassy. My initial unsophisticated attempts to construct a list of 
journalists who worked in Laos are based on word-of-mouth referrals and 
matching datelines with names. My database, which is still in an embryonic state, 
is Appendix D. 
2 In fact, the Bangkok World was founded just after World War II by 
former agents of the American OSS (Office of Strategic Services), the forerunner 
to today's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Geoffrey Gunn's Political Struggles 
in Laos: 1930-1954 provides a fascinating look into the operations of the OSS in 
Laos and Thailand during this period. 
3 A former member of the U.S. Embassy staff who reported having often 
put up Holt for the night in the early 1960s recounted this to me. Holt is ill in 
London and could not be interviewed. 
4 Interview with Tim Page, February 2001. 
5 William Hammond of the U.S. Army Center for Military History has 
done much analysis of the accreditation system in Saigon and its effect on U. S. 
reporting. See, in addition to his Reporting Vietnam, the working paper "Who 
Were the Saigon Correspondents and Does it Matter?," 2000. 
6 George Dalley told this author that he resigned from USAID because he 
believed that the Embassy was at least indirectly responsible for the assassination 
of a Lao friend of his, a colonel in the Royal Lao Army. I have not been able to 
independently confirm this. However, the assassination itself is described in 
Warner's Shooting at the Moon. 
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7 In a subsequent interview (March 2001) McKeithen also said that most 
of the reporters "were a joke" and "not very good." This gave the USAID workers 
even less an incentive to be helpful to them. 
8 Dommen interview, July 2000. 
9 Ben Bagdikian asserts in The Media Monopoly (2000 edition) that The 
New Yorker was solidly mainstream (i.e. in favor of the U.S. Government 
position) in its approach to the Indochina conflict until July 1967, when it 
published a story by Jonathan Schell based on his visit to a Vietnamese village. 
Not incoincidentally, Bagdikian reports, The New Yorker's upscale advertisers 
began to back away from the magazine following publication of the story. In the 
future, I plan to do a more systematic analysis of Shaplen's role in covering Laos 
and in contributing to the editorial tone of the magazine prior to the coming to 
prominence of Jonathan Schell. 
1° For these and other examples of censorship by Washington and New 
York media headquarters, see Prochnau' s Once Upon a Distant War and Philip 
Knightley's The First Casualty. 
11 Branfman' s key role was confirmed by many of the people I 
interviewed. His role is also described in Christopher Hitchens' "The Case 
Against Henry Kissinger: The Making of a War Criminal," Harper's Magazine, 
February 2001. 
12 Several persons interviewed for this research, including Arthur Dammen 
and Jerome Doolittle (who disagree on nearly every other point associated with 
the war) correctly assert that the Senate committees responsible for Laos had 
received briefings from the administration throughout the years of American 
involvement. Those Senators therefore could not legitimately claim ignorance of 
the "secret war." For example, Senator Symington visited Laos on several 
occasions prior to the hearings of 1969, and received on-the-ground briefings. 
However, it must also be pointed out that the administration did not explain the 
full details to more than a handful of legislators until the late 1960s. 
13 It is possible today to visit the caves at Vieng Xai, a few kilometers 
from Sam Neua, where the leadership of the Pathet Lao set up shop to avoid the 
bombs. Each of the principal Pathet Lao leaders had a private cave, containing 
bedrooms, offices, and a kitchen. Today the cave complexes are a popular 
destination for tourists who can manage to get to remote Vieng Xai near the 
Vietnamese border. 
---
14 Both Proclmau and Knightley describe many examples of this 
phenomenon. They quote the so-called "renegade" reporters of the era as 
admitting that they had gone to Vietnam in support of the U.S. Government 
position, and changed their minds only later on, after the numbers of U. S. 




The air war in Laos was not officially revealed to the American people or 
Congress for the best part of five years, despite being meticulously reported by 
both Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese radio. The full extent of American 
bombing became public knowledge only after the findings of secret 1969 
Congressional hearings by the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee were 
made public. By the time the air war finally came to an end with the conclusion 
of a cease-fire agreement early in 1973, Laos had been subjected to some of the 
heaviest aerial bombardment in the history of warfare. 
-- Martin Stuart-Fox, A History ofLaos 
This paper revolves around one central question: How can it be that a war 
of the magnitude prosecuted by the United States in Laos went largely unreported 
in the American press for so many years? We have seen that the reasons are 
multilayered and complex. The Cold War consensus that developed in the United 
States after World War II enabled a succession of presidents to do what they 
wished in Laos with only limited interest or intervention by the Congress or the 
mainstream American media. From the mid- l 950s to the mid- l 960s, policy 
discussions among the Washington elites -- including not only the decision 
makers in the executive and legislative branches but also the "Fourth Estate"--
focused not on the ideology of American involvement in Indochina but on the 
strategy of prosecuting that involvement. The American press tended to represent 
the U. S. -centered, normative view of the conflict (i.e., through an anti-
Communist prism, rather than as the civil and nationalist conflict that it was). 
-
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Until the late 1960s, the "framing" of the st01y with respect to Indochina 
in general and to Laos in particular was nearly identical with the official U. S. 
Government line. As with Vietnam, journalistic coverage of Laos followed, not 
led, public opinion. Not until the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in Janumy 1968 and 
the subsequent collapse of the domestic consensus did the press begin to question 
the fundamental issue of whether the United States should be involved in 
Indochina at all , or to examine the Laos theater in particular. 
Throughout the period under study it is likewise clear that the routines of 
American journalism--including "professionalism," "objectivity" and the 
management imperatives of U. S. -based editors and production teams--meant that 
reporters in the field were severely constrained in what they were able to write or 
to get into publication. Ironically, these routines, upon whose very foundation 
rests the reputation of American journalism, served to cripple and tarnish the 
performance of its practitioners in Laos. The war was mainly covered by 
overworked, underpaid "stringers" or by correspondents who were based 
elsewhere and came to Laos only in times of crisis. Significantly, very few of the 
reporters spoke Lao or French or had significant on-the-ground experience in 
Laos. Indeed, few had any interest in reporting on Laos at all. For them, the story 
lay elsewhere -- in Vietnam, where the American commitment was more visible, 
and where the prospect of getting one' s big journalistic "break" seemed more 
probable. 
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The Primacy of Government Secrecy 
The inhospitable terrain of Laos and the difficulty of logistics, transport, 
and communications also played a role. But it was the refusal of the U.S. 
Government to acknowledge its role in Laos that was chiefly and directly 
responsible for the large gaps, inconsistencies, and errors in coverage in the U. S. 
media. Over a period of years, the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane systematically 
denied or misrepresented the true nature of American involvement. Policy makers 
in Washington and Vientiane, motivated by a desire to avoid being blamed for a 
breakdown in the Geneva "neutrality" agreements on Laos, pretended that the 
American role in the conflict was purely in reaction to Communist "aggression," 
and driven only by the loftiest ideals. It thereafter followed, from the point of 
view of officialdom, that the media should not be allowed access to the darker 
aspects of the policy that would have caused controversy in the United States. 
Given the American mass media's overwhelming dependence on the U.S. 
Government to provide the "news," it is no wonder that much of the coverage was 
insubstantial, incorrect, or blatantly misleading. Yet Washington could not 
control the foreign press, including Pathet Lao and Vietnamese radio stations, 
which regularly reported on CIA-directed ground combat and the war from the air. 
Australian, British, and European news media also appear to have done a more 
comprehensive job than the American press at describing the U. S. role. That so 
few alternative accounts or points of view found their way into the American 
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press is of some concern, as it indicates at best censorship on the part of stateside-
based editors, at worst direct collusion with the policy makers. An apparent close 
link between some journalists and their sources in American intelligence may 
have been responsible for the perpetuation of some misinformation in the 
American press, though this particular aspect of the story awaits further 
investigation. 
The war in Laos, while inextricably linked to the one next door in Vietnam, 
differed from it in two important respects. It was unacknowledged; and it was not 
subject to the usual bureaucratic checks, balances, and controls normally present 
during wartime. The ground portion of the conflict, the so-called "guerrilla war," 
was carried out in the main by Hmong mercenaries under the direction of CIA 
advisers, and the bombing campaign was under the direct personal supervision of 
a succession of U.S. ambassadors in Laos. Meanwhile, the public affairs system 
that the U. S. Government established in Saigon, with its interlinking gatekeepers 
in the Embassy and the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACY), 
had no counterpart in Laos. These factors together produced a situation in which 
responsibility for the war could be avoided, and journalists could be stonewalled 
until they simply gave up trying to get to the bottom of the story. 
Of course, there were exceptions to this general trend, and there are many 
concrete examples of fine and incisive reporting by certain individual reporters. 
What is clear, however, is that American journalism in Laos did not fare as well 
as it could have, or should have. Most of the journalists interviewed in the course 
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of this research admit as such. In sum, as one former correspondent writing of the 
American experience in Vietnam, has put it, " ... conventional journalism could 
no more reveal this war than conventional firepower could win it." 1 
Next steps 
Much further work needs to be done in order to substantiate fully my 
hypotheses regarding journalistic coverage of the war in Laos. Chief among the 
tasks to be undertaken is a more systematic analysis of American newspaper and 
magazine clip files, as well as a more thorough comparison between and among 
American, Australian, and European accounts. An analysis of television coverage 
also should be done, along the lines conducted by Hallin with respect to the 
coverage of Vietnam. 
These activities must await my return to the United States. Meanwhile, I 
intend to begin research into the relevant Lao archives, scanty though they are, in 
order to reconstruct a timeline of what was reported from the Pathet Lao vantage 
point. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the Laos war concerns the 
number of North Vietnamese troops who were operating or alleged to have been 
operating inside Laos at various times during the period under study. Wildly 
varying estimates were bandied about by the Royal Lao Government and the U.S. 
Government, and were picked up and perpetuated by the media at the time. Even 
today, various sources interviewed for this project disagree strenuously about the 
-
117 
capacity, extent, and influence of the North Vietnamese Army. The scholarly 
literature is also difficult to reconcile. After a year of researching this topic, I 
have not been able to correlate to my satisfaction the alleged numbers and dates, 
nor am I sure there is a definitive answer. This is no small dilemma. Presumably 
one reason for U. S. actions with respect to Laos was the perceived threat of 
invasion and infiltration from Hanoi; this was the one theme consistently reported 
by the press. Therefore, it merits much greater attention than I was able to give it 
here. 
Likewise, I also intend to continue developing Appendix D, the database 
of reporters who covered Laos. In this regard I plan to seek the permission of the 
U. S. Army's Center for Military History at Fort McNair, Washington, DC, for 
access to the credentials of the reporters based in Hanoi. Construction of the 
database should lead me, in turn, to other reporters of the Vietnam War era, who 
can be contacted and interviewed regarding their experiences in or covering Laos. 
Finally, I likewise will continue to seek out participant-observers who 
were based in Laos during the period under study. A key group of persons yet to 
be interviewed are the alumni of the International Voluntary Service (IVS), some 
of whom in the late 1960s played key roles in exposing covert government 
activities to the media, and later went on to positions of influence in the domestic 
antiwar movement. Their perspectives regarding the U. S. mission in Laos and its 
interaction with the reporters should provide further understanding of this key 
aspect of the story -- a story of the uses and abuses of "professional journalism," 
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and of the fai lure to report accurately one of the major episodes of modem 
A . l . 2 mencan 11story. 
I 19 
Notes to Conclusions 
1 Michael Herr, quoted in Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty, 423. 
2 A further extension of the research could extend beyond the war, and up 
to the present. I believe that further study would show that the U. S. media 
continue to cover Laos in only the most tangential way. My initial Internet 
searches for the time frame August 2000 to April 2001, for example, revealed that 
the overwhelming number of articles with respect to Laos are focused on two 
issues. These are the lives of the Hmong immigrants in the United States, and the 
continuing search for American soldiers still listed as missing-in-action (MIA) or 
prisoners-of-war (POW) in Southeast Asia. 
Appendix A 
Persons Interviewed 
Journalists of the Vietnam War Era 
George Wilson, several discussions since January 2000 
Arnold "Skip" Isaacs, several discussions since January 2000 
Eugene Robe11s, January 2000 
Leon Daniel, May 2000 
H. D. S. Greenway, May 2000 
Arthur Oommen, July 2000 
David Lamb, December 2000 
Martin Stuart-Fox, by correspondence since December 2000 
Joseph Galloway, December 2000, by correspondence 
Ray Herndon, January 2001, by correspondence 
Richard Pyle, January 2001 , by correspondence 
Henry Kamm, February 2001 
Tim Page, February 2001 
Jack Langguth, February 2001 
Zalin Grant, February 2001 
Steve Stibbens, February 2001 
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Participant-Observers 
Eugene Bruns, several discussions since January 2000 
Timothy Castle, several discussions since January 2000 
George Dalley, several discussions since January 2000 
William Sage, November 2000 
Jacqueline Chagnon, December 2000 
Carol Ireson-Doolittle, December 2000 
Jerome Doolittle, December 2000, by correspondence 
Charles Weldon, M.D., January 2001, by correspondence; personal interview, 
March 2001 
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Edwin McKeithen, January 2001, by correspondence; personal interview, March 
2001 
Karen Olness, M.D., February 2001 
Fred Branfman, March 2001 
Vint Lawrence, March 2001 
Academics 
David Chandler, several discussions since January 2000 
William Hammond, several discussions May 2000 
William Leary, several discussions April and May 2000 
Gayle Morrison, May 2000 
Mr. Stanley Karnow 
I 0850 Spring Knoll Dr. 
Potomac, MD 20854 
Dear Mr. Karnow: 
Appendix B 
Sample Letter to Journalists 
U.S. Embassy Vientiane, Laos 
Box V 
APO AP 96546 
January 22, 2001 
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I hope you'll forgive this letter from out of the blue. I am writing at the 
suggestion of Tommy Vallely of Harvard University. Mr. Vallely, Mr. Joe 
Galloway of U.S. News and World Report, and various other contacts have told 
me you might be willing to communicate with me regarding your experiences 
covering the American war in Indochina. 
I am a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, posted to our Embassy in Laos since August 
2000. I will be here for the next couple of years as director of narcotics affairs . 
Meanwhile, I am also writing a thesis for a master's degree in journalism at the 
University of Maryland. (I an1 a former journalist myself.) The topic of my paper 
is the U.S. media's coverage (or lack thereof) of U.S. involvement in Laos, from 
the mid-l 950s to the mid-1970s. Ultimately, I hope to turn this project into a 
book. Although many books have been written about the war in Laos, none to my 
knowledge has treated the media issue in a comprehensive fashion. 
The project will examine the entire complex of circumstances surrounding the 
environment in which journalists had to report; the content of what they wrote; the 
restrictions they faced; and their own behavior in following the Laos angle of the 
larger Vietnam story. It will also examine in some detail the issue of "secrecy" 
with respect to this war, and to what degree American journalists may have failed, 
123 
deliberately or otherwise, to describe the extent of covert American involvement 
to the American public. It will incorporate an examination of relevant published 
sources, including original media reports and U.S. and foreign government 
documents; and interviews with various personalities associated with the war 
and/or the American media coverage. 
Given your long experience on the ground, I believe your recollections and 
insights would be invaluable for my project, and I hope you would be willing to 
participate. Specifically, I am interested in your views on the following issues: 
• To what extent did accepted Cold War views of the time shape the coverage? 
The Geneva Conventions? Poor road and communications infrastructure inside 
Laos? Other factors? 
• Inside Laos, what restrictions were put on the U.S. press by the Royal Lao 
Govermnent, the Washington agencies, or the U.S. Embassy? 
• What was your own experience? During your stay(s) in Southeast Asia, what 
percentage of the time did you spend covering Laos? Visiting Laos? What 
factors played a role in your own decisions regarding whether and if to report on 
Laos? To what extent were your stateside editors interested in the Laos angle? 
• More specifically, in retrospect how do you regard the coverage of Laos 
during this period? Should the American press have done anything differently? If 
so, what? How? 
• Finally, I would be grateful if you could recommend other U.S. journalists 
who covered Laos whom I should contact in regard to this research. 
Should you be willing to participate in this project, we could communicate as you 
wish--by letter, e-mail, phone, or some combination thereof. (The logistics of 
dealing with Laos have not improved that much from your day! You will recall 
that Laos is 12 hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time.) I am generally free in the 
evenings here from about 6 p.m. to 11 p.m. (6 a.m. to 11 a.m. in New York), or 
anytime on the weekends. I am also on e-mail at ardickey@aol.com and 
dickeyar@state.gov. My own phone numbers are as follows: 011-856-21-31 2-8 l l 
(home) or Ol l-856-21-212-581 (Embassy). The fax is 01 l-856-21-212-584. 
Finally, my mailing address is above, should you wish to correspond by mail 
and/or wish to drop me a line with your phone number. 
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Thank you for your consideration and I do hope to hear from you (ideally fairly 
soon, as I must complete the thesis portion of my project by April). 
Sincerely yours, 




The following is a clu·onology of some key dates in the history of post-World War 
II Indochina, with a focus on U. S. involvement in Laos and corresponding 
developments in media coverage. The fo llowing sources were used to develop 
this chronology: Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam; Gunn, Political 
Struggles in Laos; Karnow, Vietnam ; Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos, l 955-
1974"; Robbins, The Ravens,· Stevenson, The End of Nowhere; and Stuart-Fox, A 
History o.flaos. 
1945 
March: Japanese forces launch a coup against French officials throughout 
Indochina, including Laos; promise independence to the French colonies. 
April l 2: President Franklin Roosevelt dies in the United States; his vice 
president, Harry S. Truman, succeeds him. 
August 15: Surrender of the Imperial Japanese Army ends World War II. 
September 2: Ho Chi Minh proclaims Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
September/October: In Laos and Thailand, agents of the American OSS 
(forermmer of CIA) assist the Lao 1ssara ("independence") movement against a 
French return to power 
1946 
December: First Indochina War begins. 
March: French forces commit atrocities against Lao Issara and civilians during 
the battle of Thakek. 
May: French resume control of the government of Laos. 
1947 
The Lao lssara leadership relocates to Bangkok. 




January: Dissolution of the Lao Jssara government in exile; the movement splits 
into rightist, centrist, and leftist (pro-Vietnamese) elements. 
October: In China, Communists gain control; Mao Zedong proclaims the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China. 
1950 
February: The United States recognizes the government of "South Vietnam" under 
Emperor Bao Dai. 
June: The Korean War begins. 
July: United States signs agreement to supply economic and militaiy aid to 
France ' s colonies in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). 
August: In Vietnam, Lao Prince Souphanouvong proclaims formation of the 
Pathet Lao. 
1951 
First Vietminh battalions are stationed in Laos to train Pathet Lao troops. 
1952 
November: In the U. S. , Dwight Eisenhower is elected president. 
1953 
Between March and May, Vietminh forces advance into Laos, seizing key 
positions from the French, including Sam Neua; they return in December in 
preparation for the attack on Dien Bien Phu. 
October: France acknowledges the Kingdom of Laos as an independent state 
within the French Union. 
1954 
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May 7: French defeat at Dien Bien Phu ends French involvement in Indochina. 
May to July: Geneva Conference; the resulting agreements divide Vietnam at the 
17th parallel, confirm the status of Laos as "neutral." 
August 20: In Washington, the National Security Council settles on a Laos policy 
of "covert operations on a large and effective scale." 
1955 
January: U.S. aid begins to flow directly to the govermnent of South Vietnam. 
In Laos, United States Operations Mission (USOM) established to administer 
economic assistance; later that year Program Evaluation Office, staffed by reserve 
and retired military, is set up to handle military assistance. Civil Air Transport 
(CAT), the CIA proprietary airline, conducts drops of rice and salt to victims of 
severe drought. 
In Washington, the State Department establishes a country "desk" for Laos 
(previously part of Vietnam desk). 
April: At Bandung Conference, China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
pledge non-interference in Laos. 
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1956 
July: Graham Parsons becomes U. S. Ambassador to Laos. 
1957 
CAT and U.S. Embassy begin formal contract and a C-47 is based at Vientiane. 
By December, more than 100 staff, not including covert personnel, are assigned to 
the U. S. mission in Laos. 
1958 
May: Elections for the Lao National Assembly produce significant gains for the 
Pathet Lao. The U. S. is alarmed. 
July: Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma dissolves first coalition government and 
is replaced by U. S.-backed military strongman Phoui Sananikone. 
March: Horace Smith becomes U.S. Ambassador to Laos. 
1959 
March-April: U. S. Congress investigates corruption in the aid program for Laos. 
July: U. S. Special Forces introduced into Laos. CAT changes name to Air 
America. 
September: Spike occurs in U.S. media coverage regarding alleged infiltration of 
North Vietnamese soldiers into Laos. Later, these reports are discredited. 





April: CIA station engages in election-rigging to prevent Pathet Lao gains in the 
Lao National Assembly. 
July: Winthrop Brown becomes U. S. Ambassador to Laos. 
August: Civil war begins with Kong Le coup. U.S. works with Gen. Phoumi 
Nosavan to foment a counter-coup. 
October: CIA case officer Bill Lair brings in covert troops from Thailand, recruits 
Hmong leader Vang Pao to conduct guerrilla operations on behalf of U. S. 
government. 
November: John F. Ke1medy elected president. 
December: U. S.-backed General Phoumi attacks Vientiane; more than 500 
civilians killed. Soviet airlift begins to supply Souvanna Phouma's neutralists. 
Phoumi charges DRV invasion (later admitted as propaganda). Meanwhile, lame-
duck president Eisenhower contemplates sending U. S. troops to Laos, but decides 
to let incoming President Kennedy make the decision. 
1961 
January: John F. Kennedy becomes president in the U. S. 
March 9: Two covert American advisers to Royal Lao army are killed in combat 
(representing first American deaths in Laos). 
March 23: President Kennedy holds a news conference alluding to the possibility 
of war in Laos. 
April: U. S. attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro fails ("Bay of Pigs"). 
May 11: Kennedy agrees to send U. S. agents into North Vietnam and southern 
Laos. 
May 16: Beginning of second Geneva conference. 
June 3-4: Kennedy and Soviet Premier Kruschev meet at Geneva; agree not to 
bring Laos into the wider East-West conflict. 
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August: Kennedy authorizes an increase in support for the Hmong army, including 
up to 500 covert American advisers and authorization for a total Hmong troop 
strength of 11,000. 
Establishment of the secret CIA air base at Long Tieng. 
1962 
Americans begin flying with Royal Lao air force. CIA advisers establish a secret 
headquarters for the Hmong army at Long Tieng in northeastern Laos. 
March 6: The U.S . makes a formal commitment to defend Thailand from 
Communism. 
June: U. S. news stories begin to appear popularizing AID refugee relief director 
"Pop" Buell. 
July: In Vientiane, Leonard Unger becomes U. S. Ambassador to Laos. 
July 23: Second Geneva Accords reconfirm "neutrality of Laos." 
August: U. S. begins aerial reconnaissance flights at request of Souvanna Phouma. 
October: Cuban Missile crisis almost brings U. S. and the Soviet Union to war. 
November: In Washington, Averell Harriman becomes Ke1medy's Assistant 
Secretary for Asia. 
1963 
August: The U. S. gives the Royal Lao Air Force six T-28 planes and provides 
training for Lao pilots. 
September: CBS and NBC adopt a 30-minute evening news format, essentially to 
accommodate news from Indochina (this represents a l 00% increase from 
previous 15-minute newscast). 
November: In Vietnam, President Diem is assassinated. In the U. S., President 
Kennedy is assassinated and is succeeded by his vice president, Lyndon B. 
Johnson. 
In Vientiane, Lao military strongman Phoumi Nosavan fabricates allegations of 
new Vietnamese "incursions;" these attacks are reported as fact in the American 
press. 
By the end of the year, the international press corps in Saigon includes 40 
correspondents. 
1964 
April: 7,000 North Vietnamese soldiers reported in Laos. Johnson authorizes 
low-level U. S. jet reconnaissance over Laos. 
April l 9: Military attempts a coup against Souvanna Phouma; the U. S. and 
British ambassadors intervene to restore Souvanna. 
May: U. S. reconnaissance flights begin over Plain of Jars and southern Laos (Ho 
Chi Minh Trail area). 
June: The Pathet Lao shoots down a U. S. reconnaissance plane and an escort 
plane. Six U.S. F-100 fighter-bombers retaliate. 
July: "Maximum candor" press policy is instituted at U. S. mission Saigon. In 
Vientiane, however, the policy continues to be denial of any U. S. involvement. 
August: "Gulf of Tonkin" incident in Vietnam; Congress gives President Johnson 
extraordinary powers to intervene in Southeast Asia. 
October: U. S. fighter-bombers begin flying covert missions for Royal Lao Air 
Force aircraft, which bomb Ho Chi Minh trail complex at request from U. S. 
Embassy. 
November: U.S . direct bombing of Laos ("Operation Barrel Roll") begins but 
goes unreported in U.S. press. First American jet shot down over Laos; Embassy 
claims it was on a "reconnaissance mission." Acting President Johnson is 
formally elected president in the U. S. 
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December: William Sullivan becomes U.S. Ambassador in Laos and assumes 
direction of the air war. 
By end of year, U.S. has 200,000 troops in Vietnam. 
1965 
January: Lyndon Jolmson's official inauguration as president. UPI's Arthur 
Oommen reports U. S. bombing over Laos has been going on for seven months. 
March: Johnson begins regular air attacks on North Vietnam and Laos ("Rolling 
Thunder"). Public affairs officers in Saigon are instructed to not reveal when a 
U. S. aircraft is shot down in Laos, unless U. S. personnel are killed. 
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July: Johnson decides to commit U. S. troops to the ground war in Vietnam. 
December: New York Daily News reports American aircraft spraying defoliants in 
Laos. UPI reports B-52 bombers conducting strikes inside Laos against Ho Chi 
Minh trail. The so-called "Christmas bombing halt" begins in Vietnam. 
By the end of the year, the Saigon press corps includes 282 foreign 
correspondents, of whom 110 are Americans. 
1966 
U. S. Air Force installs a tactical air navigation system atop Phou Pha Thi, Laos, 
in order to direct bombing runs against Hanoi. 
May: After the family of a serviceman killed in Laos goes to the press, the 
Pentagon announces that eleven personnel have been killed in Laos ( a gross 
underestimate). 
October: "Ravens" program begins (U. S. pilots flying as Forward Air Controllers 
in Laos but based out of Udorn, Thailand). 
By year's end, U. S. has 400,000 troops in Vietnam. The Saigon press corps 
consists of more than 500 journalists. 
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1967 
February 21: French journalist Bernard Fall is killed by a land mine near Hue. 
By year's end, U. S. has 500,000 troops in Vietnam. Domestic protests begin in 
the U.S. 
1968 
January: Clark Clifford replaces Robert McNamara as Johnson's Secretary of 
Defense and begins an internal campaign to reject a further build-up of U. S. 
troops in Vietnam. 
January 14: Royal Lao Army troops suffer heavy casualties and flee in panic at 
battle of Nam Bae. 
January 31: Hanoi launches Tet offensive against towns and villages all over 
South Vietnam. 
March 11: Fall of Phou Pa Thi (11 Americans missing and presumed dead; as of 
this writing, they remain unaccounted for). 
March 31 : President Jolmson announces he will not seek reelection. He offers a 
partial bombing halt and talks with Hanoi (hereafter, with bombing temporarily 
suspended over N. Vietnam, American bombers unload all their excess ordnance 
over Laos). 
May 4: Robert Shaplen's "Letter from Laos" in the New Yorker describes the 
catastrophes at Nam Bae and Phou Pa Thi but avoids direct reference to CIA 
activities. 
July: Reports ofU. S. saturation bombing of civilian targets on the Plain of Jars 
appear in the European press, but not the U. S. press. 
November: Richard Nixon elected president in the United States; chooses Henry 
Kissinger as National Security Adviser early December. 
By end of year, the U. S. has 540,000 troops in Vietnam. 
1969 
January: Nixon becomes President of the United States. 
March 17: First U. S. direct bombing campaign against the Plain of Jars. The 
provincial capital, Xieng Khouang, is destroyed within four days. 
March 18: Clandestine U. S. bombing of Cambodia begins. 
April: U. S. troop strength in Vietnam peaks at 554,000 and then begins to 
decline. 
April 3: UPI reports secret forays into Laos by U.S. Special Forces. 
July: G. McMurtrie Godley becomes U. S. Ambassador to Laos. The U. S. Air 
Force is conducting 300 sorties per day against targets in Laos. 
September: IVS volunteer Fred Branfman introduces press corps to refugees 
fleeing the Plain of Jars. As a result of pressure from the media, the U.S. 
Embassy for the first time permits a large group of American reporters to visit the 
AID refugee headquarters at Sam Thong. 
October I: New York Times reports extensive bombing on Plain of Jars. 
October 20: Senator Symington conducts hearings in Washington; for the first 
time, details of U. S. activity in Laos are described to Congress; however, the 
hearing is closed and the results are classified. 
November 15: Large antiwar demonstrations in Washington, DC. 
November 16: First press reports on My Lai massacre. 
By year's end, American troop strength has been reduced by 60,000. 
1970 
January: U. S. evacuates Plain of Jars prior to final "scorched earth" campaign. 
February: T. D. Allman and two other journalists "discover" CIA base at Long 
Tieng after walking across the mountain from Sam Thong. 
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February 17: USAF employs B-52 bombers over Laos for first time. News is 
reported by New York Times. 
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February 20: Henry Kissinger begins secret negotiations with North Vietnamese 
in Paris. 
February 25: Allman story in Bangkok Post reveals existence of the secret base at 
Long Tieng. 
March 6: President Nixon states to the press that "no American stationed in Laos 
has ever been killed in combat"; more than 90 journalists converge on Vientiane 
to investigate. 
March 18: Nixon initiates secret bombing of Cambodia. 
May 4: Kent State incident occurs, at which U. S. National Guards shoot and kill 
four antiwar protesters. Domestic opposition to war reaches fever pitch. 
June: Secret Senate hearings on Laos take place. 
June 8: Boston Globe reports USAID chief's admission to the Senate that USAID-
Laos has been a cover for CIA activity since 1962. 
By year' s end, the U. S. has further reduced its troops in Vietnam to 280,000. 
1971 
February 13: South Vietnamese troops with U.S. air support begin incursions into 
Laos to attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Operation Dewey Canyon II.). The 
U. S. military permits only approximately 20 journalists to fly into Laos for this 
operation. Four of them are killed over Laotian territory when their South 
Vietnamese Army helicopter is shot down. 
June 13: The "Pentagon Papers" are published in the New York Times (in addition 
to details of U. S. operations in Vietnam, these reports provide confirmation of 
U. S. covert activities in Laos going back to Eisenhower administration). 
December: "Skyline Ridge," the last big ground battle in the Laos theater, pits 
10,000 Hmong against several NV A battalions. 
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By year's end, U.S. troops in Vietnam number 140,000. The Saigon press corps 
has diminished to fewer than 200 reporters. 
1972 
CIA attempts to halt publication of Alfred McCoy's Politics of Heroin in 
Southeast Asia, which among other things alleges that Air America is facilitating 
movement of opium within Laos. 
February: Nixon goes to China. 
June: Five persons are arrested breaking into the Democratic National Committee 
headquarters in Washington, DC (beginning of so-called "Watergate Scandal," in 
which President Nixon will eventually be implicated). 
November: President Nixon is re-elected. 
1973 
January: U. S. and North Vietnam negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam. 
February: In Paris, cease-fire is arranged with respect to Laos. 
March: Last U. S. troops leave Vietnam. 
June 4: Deadline for final withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos (U. S. 
withdraws most of its personnel by the deadline, but the North Vietnamese do 
not). 
November: Congress overrides Nixon 's veto of law limiting the presidents ' right 
to wage war. 
1974 
January: South Vietnamese President Thieu announces resumption of war in 
Vietnam. 
April: New coalition government formed in Laos, including Pathet Lao. 
August 9: Nixon resigns and is replaced by his vice president, Gerald Ford. 
1975 
January: NV A launches a new offensive against the South, but Congress rejects 
U. S. re-involvement. 
Mid-April: Pathet Lao forces take up arms again, but do not attack Vientiane, 
waiting to see what will happen in Cambodia and South Vietnam. 
April 17: Phnom Penh falls to the Khmer Rouge. 
April 29: Last Americans are evacuated from Saigon. 
April 30: Saigon falls to North Vietnamese forces. 
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May 12-14: CIA evacuates Hmong General Vang Pao and 2,500 Hmong to safety 
in Thailand; on May 14, Long Tieng falls to advancing Pathet Lao troops. 
August 23: Vientiane falls to the Pathet Lao. 
December 2: Pathet Lao accepts abdication of the king of Laos; declares the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic 
1976 
Exodus of Lao with ties to the former Royal Lao Government begins; over the 
next couple of years, nearly one tenth of the population flees to Thailand and 
thence to Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. 
November: Jimmy Carter elected President of the United States. 
1977 
January: Carter becomes president, pardons 10,000 Vietnam draft evaders. 
1978 
New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm receives Pulitzer Prize for calling 
attention to the plight of Indochina's refugees. 
1981 
Mirmeapolis journalist Ruth Hammond reports that Hmong general Vang Pao is 
extorting money from U. S.-based Hmong. 
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Name of Reporter 
Arbuckle, Tammy 
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Appendix D 
Reporters of the Vietnam Era Who Covered Laos 
Media Organization Base(s) where assigned, with dates 
Washington Star, then UPI Vientiane 
Bangkok Post, free lance 
Washington Post Washington 
AP Vientiane, early 1960s 
AP Vientiane, 196 1-63 ; Saigon, 63-? 
Washington Post 
Chicago Daily News Saigon 
New York Herald Tribune, NY Times 
New York Times, Washington Post Post bureau chief Saigon, 1968-1 973 
Associated Press; later NY Times 1961-1965, Saigon bureau chief 
Time/Life 1966- 1970 where? 
Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) 
UPI Vientiane 




United Press International (UPI) Saigon, Tokyo, Bangkok, 1966-1973 
UPI, Los Angeles Times Hong Kong/Saigon, 1959- 1963; LA, 1965-1971 
British stringer for Reuters, NYT Approximately 1964-65 (ref. by Langguth, Page) 











Ki lled covering combat, 1965 
French 
French 


















Isaacs, Arthur "Skip" 










Reporters of the Vietnam Era Who Covered Laos 
Media Orzanization Bases(s) where assigned, with dates 
New York Times Saigon, 1970-1972 
National Geographic, FEER Saigon, Vientiane, Bangkok 
AP (photographer) Saigon, 1964-1 975 
Freelance 
UPI Saigon 
National Geographic several visits over 15-year period 
Time 1965-1 967 (Saigon); to Vientiane several times 
Time/Life Bangkok, 1968-1 970 
New York Times Saigon, 1962-1963 
freelance 
UPI Vientiane, 1961-1963; Saigon, 1963-1 966 
Dispatch News 
various British publications Vientiane, early I 960s 
Baltimore Sun Saigon, 1972-1975; then Hong Kong for 3 years 
UPI 1957-1959 
Television 
New York Times Bangkok, 1969-1 971 (Laos/Cambodia beat) 
Time/Life, Washington Post Saigon, 1959-? 
Chicago Sun Times 1965-1974 
New York Times Vientiane/Saigon, 1962-1965 (Vientiane 64-65?) 
CBS 1965-1969 where? 
UPI; later, Dow Jones Vientiane, I 960-1962; Saigon, 1963- I 965 





Now at U.S. News 
Now at Boston Globe 
Now at Los Angeles Times 
British 




Reporters of the Vietnam Era Who Covered Laos 
Name of Reporter Media Or5sanization Base(s) where assi5sned, with dates Annotations 
Mohr, Charles Time Deceased 
North, Don 
Oberdorfer, Don Knight Ridder, then Washington Post 1965-? 
Page, Tim UPI (photographer) Vientiane, 1963-1965; Saigon, 1965-1967 British; worked for AID Laos 
Prochnau, William Washington Post Saigon, dates? 
Pyle, Richard AP Saigon, 1968-1973 
Rogers, Paul Brinkley Newsweek Saigon, 1968-1972 
Saar, John Time/Life 
Sanders, Pamela freelancer Vientiane, early 1960s 
Schanche, Don Saturday Evening Post New York 
Sanders, Pamela stringer for New York Times, others 
Schanberg, Sydney New York Times 
Shaplen, Robert The New Yorker New York Deceased 
Sheehan, Neil UPI Saigon, 196 I? 
Southerland, Don Christian Science Monitor 1970s? Now at Radio Free Asia 
Sterba, James New York Times Saigon, 1968-1972; also Laos? 
Stibbens, Steve Stars and Stripes; Leatherneck 1962-1 969, Saigon 
Stuart-Fox, Martin UPI Vientiane, Nov 1993-April 1995; then Saigon Australian; worked for AID 
White, Peter National Geographic Covered Laos over 20 years 
Wilde, James Time In Laos following Kong Le coup ( 1960) 
Willenson, Kim UPI Bangkok 
Wolfkill, Grant NBC (cameraman) Captured by Pathet Lao 
.i:,. 
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Annotated Bibliography on the "Secret" War in Laos 
by category of authorship 
This bibliography contains only those works with direct relevance to events in 
Laos and the media response thereto. For books about the war in Vietnam in 
general and on the broader relationship between the media and foreign policy, see 
the separate list of Supplementary Sources beginning on page 155. 
Works by Journalists and Former Journalists 
Arnett, Peter. Live From the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in 
the World 's War Zones. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. The most 
famous reporter of the Vietnam era spent a good deal of time in Laos; yet 
he devotes only 12 pages of this book to that aspect of his experiences. 
Browne, Malcolm. Muddy Boots and Red Socks: A Reporter's Life. New York: 
Times Books, 1993. Like Arnett, Browne reported out of Laos on many 
occasions, but his assessment is that Laos "didn't matter" as a story. 
Dommen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos: The Politics o.f Neutralization. Revised 
edition. New York: Praeger, 1971. Dommen, who covered the Indochina 
wars first for UPI and then the Los Angeles Times, is still considered one 
of the leading authorities on Laos today. 
___ . Laos: Keystone of Indochina. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 
. "Social Science Research on Laos in the United States." In New Laos, ---
New Challenges, edited by Jacqueline Butler-Diaz, 249-278. Tempe, 
Arizona: Arizona State University, 1998. 
Emerson, Gloria. Winners and Losers: Battles, Retreats, Gains, Losses, and 
Ruinsjrom a Long War. New York: Random House, 1976. Emerson was 
based in Saigon, 1970-1972. She befriended some of the young 
International Voluntary Service (IVS) workers in Vietnam and Laos, 
whose perspectives questioning the war brought great nuance to her 
reporting. 
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Fall , Bernard .. Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960-1961. New 
York, Doubleday: 1969. Fall, an American-French scholar, was 
correspondent for The Nation and freelanced for other publications. 
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Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 
1972. This is the classic study of the Kennedy elite who presided over the 
war. 
Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House. New 
York: Summit, 1983. The investigative journalist who exposed the My Lai 
massacre is unrelentingly merciless in his depiction of Kissinger and 
Nixon as lying manipulators in their conduct of the war, including 
activities in Laos. 
Isaacs, Arnold. Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy. 
---
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Isaacs was the 
Baltimore Sun correspondent in Saigon from 1972-1975. 
. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
Isaacs, Arnold R., Gordon Hardy, and MacAlister Brown, eds. Vietnam 
Experience: Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston 
Publishing Company, 1987. Isaacs' co-authors Hardy and Brown were, 
respectively, an editor for Boston Publishing Company and a professor of 
political science at Williams College. 
Kremmer, Christopher. Stalking the Elephant Kings: In Search of Laos. Chiang 
Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1997. This book by an Australian 
journalist is mainly a travelogue dealing with the fate of the Lao royal 
family, but there are some references to the war. 
Merritt-Hamilton, Jane. Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans and the 
Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. This account by a former Vietnam-era stringer is 
quite comprehensive but also controversial due to its one-sided account of 
the CIA-Hmong struggle against the North Vietnamese. It perpetuates, 
among other things, the persistent myth that the Pathet Lao subjected the 
Hmong to chemical weapons attacks. 
144 
Prochnau, William. Once Upon a Distant War: Young War Correspondents and 
the Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Times Books, 1995. This 
etlmography is an excellent account of the experiences of reporters during 
the first years of the wars in Vietnam and Laos, by a reporter who came to 
Vietnam later on. 
Robbins, Christopher. Air America. New York: Putnam, 1979. A British 
journalist's account of the role of the CIA proprietary airline in U. S. 
policy in China and Southeast Asia. 
. The Ravens. New York: Crown, 1987. Robbins' bravura account is ---
based almost entirely on reminiscences of pilots who flew as U. S. Air 
Force Forward Air Controllers (FACs) into Laos. These pilots, who call 
themselves "Ravens" or The Edgar Allen Poe Society, now own the rights 
to this book. 
Schanche, Don. Mr. Pop. New York: McKay, 1970. This book, a shorter version 
of which appeared as an article in The Saturday Evening Post, focused on 
Edgar "Pop" Buell, an AID contractor who ran the U. S. Government 
refugee program in Laos. The story and book perpetuated a misleading 
picture of the situation by crediting Buell with activities that were actually 
being overseen by the CIA. 
Shaplen, Robert. Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia. 
---
New York, Harper and Row, 1969. Shaplen was Southeast Asia 
correspondent for The New Yorker for almost two decades. He is said to 
have had an extremely close relationship with Saigon CIA operative 
Edward Lansdale. 
. A Turning Wheel: Thirty Years of the Asian Revolution by a 
Correspondent/or the New Yorker. New York: Random House, 1969. 
Stuart-Fox, Martin. Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern 
Laos. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996. This is one of many Laos-related 
books by the Australian scholar who was a UPI correspondent, first in 
Vientiane, then in Saigon, from 1963 to 1966. 
A History of Laos. London: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
"Vietnam in Laos: Hanoi's Model for Kampuchea." Essays on Strategy 
and Diplomacy. The Keck Center for International Strategic Studies. 
Claremont, CA: 8 (1987). 
145 
Stuart-Fox, Martin, and Mary Kooyman. Historical Dictionary of Laos. 
Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1992. 
Warner, Roger. Shooting at the Moon. South Royalton, Vermont: Steerforth 
Press, 1996. First published in 1995 by Simon and Schuster as Back Fire: 
The CIA 's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam. This 
book won the Overseas Press Club award for foreign affairs reporting. 
Works by Participant-Observers 
Blaufarb, Douglas. Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos. 
Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1972. R-919-ARPA. This is a 
declassified study by the former CIA chief of station in Vientiane from 
1964 to 1966. Blaufarb himself had been a journalist before joining the 
CIA. 
_ __ . The Counterinsurgency Era: U S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to 
the Present. New York: The Free Press, 1977. 
Colby, William. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1978. The late Director of Central Intelligence was instrumental 
in launching the CIA-led counterinsurgency in Laos as well as the Phoenix 
program in Vietnam. 
Doolittle, Jerome. The Bombing Officer. New York: A.P. Dutton, 1972. 
Doolittle was a press officer at Embassy Vientiane 1968-1970; he resigned 
after President Nixon stated publicly that no Americans had been killed in 
combat in Laos. Doolittle later became a novelist. This book, while 
fiction , is quite faithful to actual events. 
Hannah, William. The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War. Lanham, Md.: 
Madison Books, 1987. The author, a Foreign Service Officer, served as 
State Department desk officer for Laos, then as deputy chief of mission in 
Bangkok during the war. He is a revisionist of the right, claiming that 
U. S. failures in Laos were key to the overall debacle in Indochina. 
Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the 
Administration of John F. Kennedy. New York: Doubleday, 1967. 
Hilsman, Kennedy' s Assistant Secretary for East Asia, was deeply 
involved in U. S. policy toward Laos. Today he works to decrease the 
influence of the CIA in U. S. foreign policy. 
146 
Kulm, Ernie. Unpublished oral history. Georgetown University Association for 
Diplomatic Studies. Foreign Affairs Oral History. Interview by Arthur J. 
Dommen, March 1995. Kulm worked with Edgar "Pop" Buell in the AID 
refugee program. His memoirs reflect a concerted effort by the U. S. 
mission in Laos to thwart press efforts to learn the extent of CIA activity. 
Lederer, William J. A Nation of Sheep. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. , 1961. 
Lederer, also the co-author of the popular novel The Ugly American, was a 
Naval officer assigned to the U. S. Pacific Command in Hawaii . Nation of 
Sheep was an impassioned argument that the U.S. press and the U.S . 
government had been "duped" into believing the North Vietnamese had 
invaded Laos in 1959. 
McKeithen, Edwin T. "The Role of North Vietnamese Cadres in the Pathet Lao 
Administration of Xieng Khouang Province." Vientiane, Laos: American 
Embassy, April I 970. Unpublished paper. McKeithen was a USAID 
employee based in Xieng Khouang. 
__ . "Life Under the P. L. in the Xieng Khouang Ville Area." Unpublished 
paper, undated. 
Meeker, Oden. The Little World of Laos. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1959. As the director of CARE in Laos, Meeker witnessed the early USG 
aid build-up and expressed skepticism about it to the press . 
Parker, James E. Codename Mule: Fighting the Secret War in Laos for the CIA. 
Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997. Parker was a CIA adviser to the 
Hmong army in Laos in the 1970s. 
Schlesinger, Arthur. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Schlesinger was one of Kennedy's 
closest advisers, including during the Laos crisis of 1961. 
Secord, Richard. Honored and Betrayed: Jrangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret 
War in Laos. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1992. One of the celebrated 
figures in the Irangate scandal, Secord began his long government career 
as an Air Force colonel involved in running Ravens flight operations from 
Udorn, Thailand, into Laos. 
147 
Sisouk Na Champassak. Storm Over Laos. Praeger, 1961. This is one of the few 
works about the war written by a Lao, in this case a member of the 
southern Royal family. 
Stieglitz, Perry. In a Little Kingdom. Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990. 
Although Stieglitz was a USIS officer in Vientiane during the key build-up 
in the early 1960s, his book mainly deals with his romance with, and 
marriage to, the daughter of Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The 
few references to the war make no mention of the fact that the CIA was 
involved in rmming the Hmong army or that the U.S. Air Force was 
bombing Laos. 
Sullivan, William H. Obligatto: Notes on a Foreign Service Career. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1984. Curiously, despite Ambassador Sullivan's role in 
personally directing the war in Laos from 1964 to 1969, he makes only 
limited references to those events. 
Toye, Hugh. Laos: Buffer State or Battleground. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968. Toye was a British military officer assigned to Laos from 
1960-1962. 
Weldon, Charles. Tragedy in Paradise: A Count,y Doctor in Laos. Bangkok: 
Asia Books, 1999. Weldon was the USAID public health director in Laos 
from 1963-1974. 
Works by Academics 
Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. Apprentice Revolutionaries: The 
Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-85. Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1986. Brown is a political science professor at Willian1s College. 
Zasloff is one of the preeminent authorities on the Pathet Lao and its 
relationship with North Vietnam; he conducted several other studies of 
that revolutionary movement along with Brown, former Ambassador 
Leonard Unger (below), and others. 
Castle, Timothy Castle. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U S. Military Aid to 
the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993. Castle was a USAF pilot who flew in Laos in the early 1 960s. 
He has since become a military historian specializing in Laos. This book 
and his more recent One Day Too Long (below) have made good use of 
the most recently declassified material on the war in Laos. 
..... 
___ . One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North 
Vietnam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
148 
Conboy, Kenneth, and James Morrison. Shadow War: The CIA 's Secret War in 
Laos. Boulder: Paladin Press, 1995. 
Corn, David. Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA 's Crusades. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1994. 
Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and 
Its Aftermath. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993 . 
This groundbreaking study by a legal scholar contains a chapter on the 
"Unenforceable Unconstitutionality" of the war in Laos. 
Goldstein, Martin E. American Policy toward Laos. Cranbury, N.J.: Associated 
University Presses, Inc. , 1973 . A political scientist at the University of 
Pennsylvania wrote this early study, prior to the declassification of many 
crucial documents. 
Gunn, Geoffrey C. Political Struggles in Laos (1939-1954): Vietnamese 
Communist Power and the Lao Struggle.for National Independence. 
Bangkok: Editions Duang Kan10l, 1988. Gmm is an Australian historian 
specializing in Laos. 
Ireson, W. Randall, and Carol J. Ireson. "Laos." In Douglas Allen and Ngo 
Vinha Long, eds. Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the 
War. Boulder: Westview, 1991. The Iresons were representatives of the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC, or Quakers) in Laos in the 
1980s. 
Kaiser, David. Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins o.fthe Vietnam War. 
Cambridge, Mass .: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. 
Kaiser is a professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College. 
Langer, Paul F. , and Zasloff, Joseph J. North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: 
Partners in the Struggle for Laos. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1970. 
Leary, William. "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974." In Studies in 
Intelligence (winter 1999-2000): 71-86. Unclassified Edition. Leary is a 
professor of history at the University of Georgia. He is the leading 
authority on the history of CIA aviation. 
149 
___ . "The CIA and the 'Secret War' in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 
1971-1972." In The Journal of Military History 49 (July 1995): 805-818. 
_ __ . Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in 
Asia. University of Alabama Press, 1984. 
Littauer, Raphael and Norman Uphoff, eds. The Air War in Indochina. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1972. 
Prados, John. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999. Prados is a military historian 
specializing in Vietnam. 
Randle, Robert F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Randle was a political 
scientist at Columbia University. His book is considered the definitive 
history of what happened at the Geneva Conference. 
Stevenson, Charles. The End of Nowhere: American Policy toward Laos Since 
I 954. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973. Originally written as a doctoral 
dissertation at Harvard University, Stevenson's book is a case study of the 
American decision-making process vis-a-vis Laos. 
Zasloff, Joseph J. "American Political Research on Laos, 1954-1993." In New 
Laos, New Challenges, edited by Jacqueline Butler-Diaz, 211-248. Tempe, 
Arizona: Arizona State University, 1998. Zasloff was and continues to be 
the leading authority on the relationship between North Vietnam and the 
Pathet Lao . 
---. The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. 
Heath, 1973. 
Zasloff, Joseph .T., and Allan E. Goodman, eds. Indochina in Conflict. Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Goodman for many years was the 
graduate dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. 
Zasloff, Joseph J. , and Leonard Unger, eds. Laos Beyond the Revolution. New 
York: St. Martin 's Press, 1991. Unger is a former U.S. Ambassador to 
Laos. 
Zasloff, Joseph, J. , and MacAlister Brown, eds. Communism in Indochina: New 
Perspectives. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975. 
Works by Anti-War Activists 
Adams, Nina, and Alfred W. McCoy, eds. Laos: War and Revolution. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1970. This reader contains many useful articles 
for the researcher interested in the issues discussed in this thesis. 
150 
Branfman, Fredric. Voices.from the Plain of Jars . New York: Harper and Row, 
1972. Branfman, a volunteer with International Voluntary Services (IVS) 
in Laos, became disenchanted with U. S. policy and was responsible for 
many leaks to the press . He worked briefly as a stringer for Dispatch 
News and became a leader of the antiwar movement in the Untied States . 
- - - . "Refugee Camps in the Vientiane Plain." Unpublished draft. April 
1971 . 
Chomsky, Noam. At War with Asia: Essays on Indochina. New York: Pantheon, 
1970. Chomsky, a philosophy professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), was a leader of the anti-war movement. 
Gettleman, Marvin, ed. Conflict in Indochina: A Reader on the Widening War in 
Laos and Cambodia. New York: Random House, 1970. 
McCoy, Alfred W. The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. Harper and Row, 
1972. Revised as The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global 
Drug Trade. Brooklyn, N.J.: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991. McCoy's claim 
that CIA operatives in Laos were complicit in the opium trade so enraged 
the CIA that it launched an all-out offensive to halt publication of the 
original version of the book. 
Official Documents of the United States Congress 
House of Representatives. Committee on Government Operations. U. S. Aid 
Operations in Laos. House Rep011 546, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959. 
Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Aid Activities in Laos. Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on U. S. Security Agreements and Commitments 




___ . Committee on Foreign Relations. Laos: April 1971. Staff Report 
Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on U. S. Security Agreements 
and Conunitments Abroad, 92nd Congress, 1st session, 1971. 
___ . Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Security Agreements 
and Commitments Abroad: Kingdom of Laos. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on U. S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 
part 2, 9 l st Congress, l st session, 1969. 
___ . Committee on Foreign Relations. Security Agreements and 
Commitments Abroad. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations by 
the Subcommittee on U. S. Security Agreements and Commitments 
Abroad, 91 st Congress, 2nd session, 1970. 
Other 
(Note: The following four books are representative of recent literature 
documenting the lives of the Hmong in exile in the United States. 
Chan, Sucheng. Hmong Means Free : Life in Laos and America. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1994. 
Faderman, Lillian, with Ghia Xiong. I Begin My Life All Over: The Hmong and 
the American Immigrant Experience. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998. 
Faderman is an author and academic specializing in feminist and 
multiethnic studies. 
Morrison, Gayle. Sky is Falling, An Oral History of the CIA 's Evacuation of the 
Hmongfrom Laos. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Co., 1999. Morrison is 
a trained social worker who has provided counseling to Hmong 
communities in California for many years. 
Pfaff, Tim. Hmong in America: Journey from a Secret War. Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin: Chippewa Valley Musewn Press, 1995. Pfaff is the curator of 
the Chippewa Valley Museum, which has undertaken a project to 
document Hmong history and culture in the Eau Claire area. 
152 
Newspaper and Magazine Articles 
Allman, T.D. "Long Tieng Yields its Secrets." Bangkok Post, 25 February I 970. 
Arnold, Martin. "Thousands in U. S. Protest on Laos." New York Times, 11 
February 1971. 
"Assessing the Laos Invasion." Time, 5 April 1971. 
Baldwin, Hanson W. "A Hell of a Place to Have to Fight In." Life, 31 March 
1961. 
Branfman, Fredric. "The Media, the War, and 1.5 Million Ghosts: Thirty Years 
Later, Reflections on the Press Corps in Indochina." San Diego News and 
Review, 12 November 1998. 
"Concealing the Facts on Laos," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 February 1971. 
Durdin, Tillman. "Laotians Report No Word of an Incursion by Saigon." New 
York Times, 1 February 1971. 
Everingham, John. "One Family's Odyssey to America. National Geographic, 
May 1980, 652-661. 
Garrett, W. E. "The Hmong of Laos: No Place to Run." National Geographic, 
January 1974, 78-111. 
---. "Thailand: Refuge from Terror." National Geographic, May 1980, 633-
642. 
Greenway, H. D.S. "The Pendulum of War Swings Wider in Laos." L(fe, 3 April 
1970, 32-36. 
"Hacking it in Laos," Philadelphia Bulletin, 23 March 1971. 
Hersh, Seymour. "How We Ran the Secret Air War in Laos. New York Times 
Magazine, 29 October 1972. 
"Laos Jury Still Out." Omaha World-Herald, 27 March 1971. 
• 
McCartney, James. Mum's the Word on Secret War in Laos." Philadelphia 
Inquirer, 2 February 1971 . 
153 
Moore, Robert W. "War and Quiet on the Laos Frontier." National Geographic, 
May 1954, 665-680. 
Mullin, C. "The Secret Bombing of Laos: The Story Behind Nine Years of U.S. 
Attacks," The Asia Magazine 14/19 (12 May 1974), 6. 
Perazic, Elizabeth. "Little Laos: Next Door to Red China." National 
Geographic. January 1960, 46-69. 
Roberts, Chalmers. "Laos Border Activities Still a Secret." Washington Post, 2 
February 1971. 
Schanche, Donald. "An American Hero." Saturday Evening Post. 2 June and 9 
June, 1962. 
Sherman, Spencer. "The Hmong in America: Laotian Refugees in the 'Land of 
the Giants."' Photos by Dick Swanson. National Geographic, October 
1988, 586-610. 
Southerland, Daniel. "Laos Shortfall Stirs Sticky Queries," Christian Science 
Monitor, March 29, 1971. 
---. "What U. S. Bombing Feels Like to Laotians," Christian Science 
Monitor, 14 March 1970. 
"Strained Seams in the Great Alliance." Life, 31 May 1954, 20-24. 
Shaplen, Robert. "Our Involvement in Laos." Foreign Affairs 48/3 (April 1970), 
478-493. 
"Letter from Laos." The New Yorker, 2 August 1970. 
"Letter from Laos." The New Yorker, 4 May 1968. 
"Letter from Laos." The New Yorker. 2 August 1976. 




White, Peter T. "The Mekong: River of Terror and Hope." Photos by W.E. 
Garrett. National Geographic. December 1968: 737-787. 
______ Report on Laos. Photos by W.E. Garrett. National Geographic. 
August 1961: 241-275. 
"The Withdrawal from Laos." Boston Globe, 23 March 1971. 
Supplementary Sources 
General Works on Vietnam, the Media, and Foreign-Policy Decision-Making 
Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 
Altheide, David. "Iran v. U. S. News: The Hostage Story Out of Context." In 
Television Coverage of the Middle East, edited by William C. Adams. 
Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981. 
Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: 
Harcourt Brace and Company, 1950. 
Bagdikian, Ben H. The Media Monopoly. Revised Edition. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2000. 
Boorstin, Daniel J. Boorstin. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. 
Twenty-fifth aimiversary edition. New York: Vintage Books. 1987. 
155 
Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: A Search for a Paradigm. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1981. 
Cohen, Bernard C. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 1963 . 
- --. "Mass Communication and Foreign Policy." In Domestic Sources of 
Foreign Policy, edited by James N. Rosenau, 195-212. New York: The 
Free Press, 1967. 
Cookman, Claude H. "Marc Riboud in North Vietnam: Seeing the War from the 
Other Side." National Press Photographers Association. News 
Photographer, January 2000. 
Dayan, Daniel and Elihu Katz. Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1992. 
Dobbs, Michael. "The Amanpour Factor: How Television Fills the Leadership 
Vacuum on Bosnia." Washington Post, 23 July 1995. 
Edward, Julia. Women of the World: The Great Foreign Correspondents. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1988. 
Gans, Herbert J. Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC 
Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time. New York: Vintage Books, 1980. 
Gowing, Nik. "Behind the CNN Factor." Washington Post, 31 July 1994. 
156 
Grant, Zalin. Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United 
States in Vietnam. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. 
Hallin, Daniel C. The "Uncensored" War: The Media and Vietnam. Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1986. 
___ . We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the 
Public Sphere. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Hammond, William M. Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War. 
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998. 
___ . "Who Were the Saigon Correspondents and Does It Matter?" Working 
Paper #2008-8. Boston: Harvard University/The Joan Shorenstein Center 
on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, 2000. 
Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988. 
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983 . 
Kattenburg, Paul M. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-75. 
New Brunswick: Transaction, 1982. 
Kegley, Charles W., Jr. , and Eugene R. Wittkopf. American Foreign Policy: 
Patterns and Process. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 
Kellner, Douglas. Television and the Crisis of Democracy. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1 990. 
Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers: American Generals Re.fleet on Vietnam. 
New York: Da Capo Press, 1991. 
Knightly, Philip. The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam, The War 
Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. 
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1979. 
Larson, James F. "Television and U. S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Iran 
Hostage Crisis." Journal ofCommunication (August 1986): 108-130. 
157 
Library of America. Reporting Vietnam: American Journalism, 1959-1975. New 
York: Literary Classics of the United States, 2000. 
Lowi , Theodore J. "Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and 
Foreign Policy." In Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, edited by James 
N. Rosenau, 295-331. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 
MacArthur, John R. Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. 
McCloskey, Herbert. "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy 
Orientation," Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, edited by James N. 
Rosenau, 51-109. New York: The Free Press. 1967. 
McMaster, Major H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert 
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. 
New York: Harper Collins, 1997. 
Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 
Neuman, Johanna. "Has CNN Replaced Envoys?" Foreign Service Journal, July 
1995, 28-30. 
Rosenau, James N. "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area." In Domestic Sources of 
Foreign Policy, edited by James N. Rosenau, 11-50. New York: The Free 
Press. 1 967. 
Rosenberg, Milton J. "Attitude Change and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era," 
Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, edited by James N. Rosenau, 111-
159. New York: The Free Press. 1967. 
Rosenstiel, Tom. "The Myth of CNN." The New Republic, 22/29 August 1994, 
27-33. 
Schudson, Michael. Discovering the News: A Social History of American 
Newspapers. New York: Basic Books. 1978. 
158 
Sheehan, Neil, et al. The Pentagon Papers. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971. 
Sorensen, Theodore. Decision-Making in the White House. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963 . 
--- . Kennedy. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. 
Spanier, John and Eric M. Uslaner. Foreign Policy and the Democratic 
Dilemmas. Third Edition. New York: CBS/Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston. 
1982. 
